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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION   2 
1.1 Research  Problem 
Building close supplier relationships is on the strategic agenda of a growing 
group of leading companies in different industries (e.g.  Philips, Unilever, P&G, 
IBM, Ford, Nokia (Geraint, 2008). Not surprisingly, because developing and 
managing value-adding working relationships with suppliers was identified as 
one of the major future trends in Purchasing and Supply Management 
(A.T.Kearney, 2007). Over the last decade a number of academics and practi-
tioners claimed that closer relationships with suppliers will result in increased 
business value (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Apart from Honda and Chrysler, an 
example that has been used very often as a best practice in this area is that of 
Japanese automakers, and especially Toyota (Dyer, 1996). These automotive 
companies managed to become the buyer of choice for their suppliers and by 
that they are able to receive a greater portion of their suppliers’ brainpower 
and attention than their competitors (i.e., preferential value; Milas, 2006). 
Inspired by the story of Toyota and the likes, many companies started trying to 
work on building closer relationships with suppliers. A lot of money and time is 
invested by these companies to get closer to their suppliers and improve col-
laboration, before they find out that it is very difficult to copy the unique way 
of Toyota. The supplier relationship development tools and techniques are easy 
to understand and to copy, but the way in which companies like Toyota are 
able to win the hearts of their suppliers appears to be very difficult to encode 
and to imitate by other companies in other industries and supply networks. The 
investment in time and resources needed to develop close buyer-supplier rela-
tionships should not be under-estimated. Therefore, both buyers and suppliers 
need to make critical choices. It is the joint changes in the ways of working that 
truly payoff, not just the changes of one company. It requires a long-term 
commitment of both parties. What makes supplier decide to invest in a specific 
customer? To find the answer to that question it is important to get insights in 
what suppliers think and feel about their customers and the working relation-
ships with them. It might be expected that these supplier opinions and 
thoughts influence supplier behavior (e.g., the way they allocate their time and 
resources to their customers). One way in which buyers try to get a clearer 
view on the opinions and thoughts of their suppliers is by conducting supplier 
satisfaction surveys (e.g. NOKIA (Maunu, 2003), Ericsson (Henningsson and 3 
Nilsson, 2009), IKEA (Davies, 2004), Honda and Chrysler (Essig and Amann, 
2009). So far, supplier satisfaction has attracted relatively little attention 
(Goffin, Lemke and Szwejczewski, 2006; Liker and Choi, 2004) and resulted only 
in a few academic studies (Benton and Maloni, 2005; Carter, 2000; Maunu, 
2003; Wong, 2000).  
These studies show that, despite the fact that it is a good instrument to get 
a snapshot of how the supplier thinks and feels at a certain moment in time, 
supplier satisfaction surveys are not capable to fully explain supplier behavior 
with regard to giving preferential benefits. Relationships between buyers and 
suppliers are coordinated and managed by people, and thus, strongly influ-
enced by them. Despite the recognized value of close relationships, which 
could not be expressed easily in economic terms (Jap, 1999), there is still a lack 
of understanding on how close social relationships between buyer and supplier 
employees influence the behaviors of their companies. 
How do suppliers react on supplier development initiatives from their cus-
tomers? What is the return on investment of investing in social relationships? 
How to increase the commitment of suppliers? What role does trust play in 
getting preferential benefits? Will suppliers be willing to adapt their processes 
to a single buyer if this buyer invests in closer social relationships? What is the 
effect of increasing information sharing and providing feedback to suppliers? 
These and many other questions of purchasing professionals still remain unan-
swered. Therefore, we dedicated our research to finding the answers to some 
of the above questions.  
The fundamental objective of this dissertation is to tackle several of the 
above questions from a supplier as well as a dyadic perspective. First, we ex-
plore the role of close social relationships in accessing and exchanging critical 
resources between supplier and buyer. The first study provides insights into 
whether suppliers that receive supplier development allocate preferential re-
sources to buyers and what benefits are generated from there for suppliers. 
Second, we will shed light on the impact of close social relationships on cus-
tomization behavior of buyers and suppliers from a dyadic perspective. Addi-
tionally, our second study investigates the role of customization and informa-
tion sharing in satisfaction with feedback and gaining affective commitment in 
a buyer-supplier relationship. Finally, the third study explores the effect of 
close social relationships on information sharing behavior of buyers and suppli-  4 
ers and the impact of Enterprise Information Portal on the improvement of the 
linkage between close social relationships and information sharing behavior. 
This chapter continues with the introduction of the central construct of in-
terest in this dissertation, a close social relationship. Next, we present the re-
search objectives of our three studies and our database. Finally, an outline of 
the dissertation is provided. 
1.2  A Close Social Relationship Theoretical Foundations 
A number of scholars have so far been attracted to study social capital theory 
(e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Tsai, 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) also in supply chain 
management (e.g., Krause, Handfield and Tyler, 2007; Lawson, Tyler and Cous-
ins, 2008; Min, Kim and Chen, 2008). Regardless of the operationalizations and 
conceptualization of the social capital construct, academia has been widely 
attracted to it because of benefits that it may bring (e.g., in Adler and Kwon, 
2002; Krause et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2008). Social capital encourages access 
to and exchanges of resources (Wasko-McLure and Faraj, 2005), and  unique 
opportunities (Uzzi, 1996). The roots of social capital may be sought in network 
theory, and especially, in Granovetter’s (1985) study of social embeddedness in 
economic exchange. Granovetter (1992) points to the exclusive role of social 
relationships in social capital. A social relationship between actors originates 
from social network where it is referred to as a tie (Seibert, Kraimer and Liden, 
2001). In this dissertation we focus on a strong close social relationship. Our 
choice is based on a claim in network closure theory that a close social relation-
ship is more beneficial than a distant one (Ahuja, 2000; Cohen, 1988). A close 
social relationship is characterized by a higher level of closeness, reciprocity 
and indebtedness compared to a ‘distant’ relationship (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; 
Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). There are several reasons why dense, close 
social relationships tend to be more beneficial than loose ones (Ahuja, 2000; 
Cohen, 1988; Lin, Cook and Burt, 2001; Uzzi, 1997). Among them the most im-
portant for our study is that a close social relationship offers access to sensitive 
information (e.g., Granovetter, 1973), privileged information, or even privi-
leged economic resources such as subsidized loans or protected markets 
(Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998).  5 
Building upon this conceptualization of a close social relationship and rec-
ognizing its significant role in accessing and exchanging exclusive resources, this 
dissertation portrays the roles of a close social relationship between buying 
and supplying companies and benefits that this may generate in their coopera-
tion. We define the objectives of this dissertation hereafter. 
1.3 Research  Objectives 
The central purpose of this dissertation, as indicated earlier, is to address a gap 
in research on the role of a human factor, a close social relationship between 
employees of a buyer’ and a supplier’ company, on resource exchanges in a 
buyer-supplier relationship. Therefore, the main problem statement that we 
will answer in this dissertation is:  
 
What is the impact of close social relationships on the exchange of resources 
in a buyer-supplier relationship? 
 
To answer the overall problem statement we emphasize the importance of 
close social relationships and explore several benefits they may bring both to 
buyers and suppliers.  
Figure 1.1 depicts the conceptual models of the three papers and how 
they are connected.  
Paper 2 (P2) is a deeper, dyadic look into the relationship between close 
social relationships and preferential benefits from Paper 1 (P1). Paper 3 (P3) 
examines more extensively the linkage between close social relationships and 
cross-functional information sharing behavior that we have first incorporated 
in P2. 
   6 
Figure 1.1 Graphical Representation of the Three Studies 
  
 
1.3.1  Chapter 2 Objective: Examine the role of close social relationships in 
gaining preferential benefits 
The objective of the first study is threefold. First, we develop a sound theoreti-
cal support for conceptualizing relationships among social capital dimensions 
(e.g., structural and relational capital) based on commitment-trust theory 
rather than on the dominant network theory. Second, although extant research 
(e.g., Adler and Kwon, 2002) has made a claim that social capital mediates re-
source exchanges by acting as an asset that receives resource support (e.g., 
investments in supplier development) and might lead to the provision of other 
resources or benefits (e.g., preferential buyer benefits), we rely on social capi-
tal theory to test this claim empirically. As such, we not only enrich current 
literature on various drivers of social capital (Moran, 2005) but we also extend 
the established perspective on the relationship between investments in sup-
plier development and manufacturing performance. By taking this supply-side 
perspective (e.g., Prahinski and Benton, 2004), we complement studies from 
the buyer’s perspective. 
Finally, in contrast to current literature on social capital theory which pri-
marily refers to benefits obtained by one party in a buyer–supplier relationship 
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(Krause et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2008; e.g., Min et al., 2008, p. 287), we pre-
sent a model that includes both a supplier’s (sales, economic performance) and 
a buyer’s (preferential benefits) benefits. In sum, we unfold our first research 
objective by: 1) defining and operationalizing relationships among social capital 
dimensions, and 2) defining and empirically testing the role of social capital, 
and especially its structural dimension (a close social relationship), in accessing 
and exchanging preferential resources. 
1.3.2  Chapter 3 Objective: Examine the impact of close social relationships 
on customization and its outcomes 
Complementary to defining and operationalizing the effects of social capital, 
and especially, close social relationships in accessing and exchanging resources, 
the second study focuses on the process through which close social relation-
ships contribute to customization. First, for this purpose, we integrate two 
separate streams of literature on adaptation and customization. While extant 
studies on adaptation provide insights into its nature, types, antecedents and 
consequences (Brennan, Turnbull and Wilson, 2003; Hallen, Johanson and 
Seyed-Mohamed, 1991; Mukherji and Francis, 2008; Rogers, Purdy, Safayeni 
and Duimering, 2007), we acknowledge the relevance of studies on customiza-
tion as a relational benefit, that includes preferential or special treatment 
(Gwinner, Gremler and Bitner, 1998) in adaptation, and we integrate these 
views together. Supply chain studies have so far paid relatively little attention 
to this phenomenon of preferential or special treatment in contrast to exten-
sive investigations in service settings (e.g., Colgate and Land, 2001; Lacey, Suh 
and Morgan, 2007). Furthermore, even though Kraatz (1998) pointed to the 
roles of a close social relationship and information sharing in customization, 
empirical evidence in supply chain is not existent. Thus, to address this gap and 
extend existing models of customization, we rely on network and social capital 
theories to design our conceptual framework. Neither social capital nor net-
work theory perspectives have ever received attention in studies on customiza-
tion in a buyer-supplier relationship. Next, following current literature indica-
tions that “alike thinking and acting” might not hold for both, buyers and sup-
pliers, as their wants and needs might differ (Ross, Buffa, Droge and Carrington, 
2009), we gather data from both sides of a buyer-supplier relationship. This is   8 
in contrast to existing papers that study supplier and buyer customization only 
from a purchasing perspective (e.g., Cannon and Perreault Jr., 1999; Mukherji 
and Francis, 2008). In sum, our approach extends research designs and analyti-
cal approaches to buyer–supplier relationships by: 1) defining and operational-
izing customization, and 2) examining the impact of a close social relationship 
on information sharing and customization, and their effects on satisfaction with 
performance feedback and affective commitment. 
1.3.3  Chapter 4 Objective: Examine the effect of close social relationships on 
cross-functional information sharing behavior provided the use of en-
terprise information portals 
Apart from the role of close social relationships in sharing information as indi-
cated by Kraatz (1998), and acknowledged in Objective 2, many companies 
enhance the information sharing process with the use of IT tools such as enter-
prise information portals (Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj and Grover, 2003). While 
prior studies have demonstrated a significant influence of communication 
technology in improving performance (Baglieri and Secchi, 2007), we aim to 
deepen our understanding about the impact of enterprise information portals 
(EIPs) on information sharing behavior in supply chains. Although EIPs seem the 
most suitable technological solutions for answering the need of cooperation 
and strategic relationships between buyers and suppliers (Baglieri and Secchi, 
2007), as presenters of communication technology, they do not replace direct 
contact between buyers and suppliers. Similarly, despite widespread research 
on buyer–supplier relationships, there is a lack of sufficient understanding of 
how the use of portals may enhance the impact of buyer’ and supplier’ em-
ployees’ close social relationships on information sharing behavior in a buyer-
supplier relationship. To the best of our knowledge no study has looked at the 
impact of close social relationships on information sharing behavior and 
whether an EIP may diminish or amplify their effects on information sharing 
behavior in a buyer-supplier relationship. 
As such, the central purpose of this paper is to broaden understanding of 
the role of close social relationships and an EIP in information sharing behavior. 
Additionally, we examine the impact of information sharing behavior on sup-
plier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance. In 9 
sum, we intend to: 1) deepen our understanding about the impact of enterprise 
information portals (EIPs) on cross-functional information sharing behavior, 2) 
examine whether the use of EIPs may enhance the influence of close social rela-
tionships on cross-functional information sharing behavior, and 3) test empiri-
cally the effect of cross-functional information sharing behavior on satisfaction 
with feedback. By investigating these effects our study aims to provide practi-
tioners with an understanding of how they may enhance cross-functional in-
formation sharing behavior and boost satisfaction with feedback in a buyer-
supplier relationship. 
1.4 A  Database 
To pursue the research objectives, we set up three complementary studies. 
Each study presents a theoretical logic developed based on insights from social 
capital, network and information systems research in the area of purchasing 
and supply chain management. To examine the hypotheses built upon the 
three conceptual frameworks, we collected data using two online surveys at 
the end of 2007 (supplier satisfaction survey) and the summer of 2008 (buyer 
satisfaction survey). This resulted in a database consisting of 185 data points 
from suppliers and 103 data points from purchasing officers. 
1.4.1 Data  Collection 
As our unit of analysis is a buyer-supplier relationship, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no objective data to test our conceptual models. Addition-
ally, the majority of the concepts in our model refer to relational atmosphere 
(e.g., trust, commitment, information sharing behavior, investments in supplier 
development; see Appendix 1 for all constructs), they have been defined and 
operationalized as latent constructs, with some of them being multidimen-
sional. Therefore, we collected our primary data through setting up two online 
surveys. Prior to online data collection we conducted interviews with five buyer 
representatives and eight representatives of supplier companies. This led us to 
identify the essential concepts for our study, as well as the appropriate decision 
makers who could serve as respondents and assess the buyer–supplier rela-  10 
tionship from both sides. All participants in these interviews agreed that key 
account managers would be most knowledgeable about buyer-supplier rela-
tionship interactions from a supplier point of view and purchasing officers from 
a buyer point of view. Following the interviews, we conducted a pilot study and 
discussed the questionnaire with the interview participants. Only minor word-
ing issues emerged and were addressed, mainly with minor changes to the 
layout.  
Furthermore, our preference for online data collection over the traditional 
paper and pencil surveying was due to four reasons. First, because we had to 
collect data from several European locations online surveys allowed for a rela-
tively large data collection in cost and time effectiveness and efficiency. Sec-
ond, online surveys proved to be very convenient in increasing the response 
rates because respondents can not only manage their responses in terms of 
time and preparation, but also the researchers can easily manage the remind-
ers. Third, even though our conceptual models build on network theory we use 
an online survey to collect data. Because it is quite common to regard a dyadic 
relationship, a buyer-supplier relationship and a close social relationship as a 
network phenomenon (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and Labianca, 2009), using ques-
tionnaires to gather data based conceptually on network theory is not new 
(Friedkin, 1980; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Wathne 
and Heide, 2004). Finally, online data collection fits the sampling frame of our 
study, and empirical results are equally reliable and valid when compared to 
mail surveys (Deutskens, de Ruyter, Wetzels and Oosterveld, 2004). 
1.4.2 Sampling 
Our data collection mirrors that of many previous studies on buyer-supplier 
collaboration (Krause et al., 2007; Krause, Scannell and Calantone, 2000; Law-
son et al., 2008; Mukherji and Francis, 2008). The buying company that partici-
pated in this study represents a large multinational manufacturer of industrial 
equipment, a part of a global industrial group, with total annual turnover of 
close to 3 billion euro and headquarters in Europe. We selected the suppliers of 
a single, core buying company as potential participants in the empirical study, 
to exclude contextual effects and allow for a single frame of reference. Suppli-
ers represent key suppliers of the buyer that are production related. 11 
Our dataset represents a larger data collection that had two phases. First, 
we collected data from suppliers’ key account managers, and then from pur-
chasing officers of the buying company. The buying company provided the 
contact data of the suppliers and the purchasing officers. In the first phase of 
data collection the selected key account managers (n = 254) received e-mail 
invitations, including a letter of encouragement from the Vice President Pur-
chasing of the buying company. They were reminded that they could evaluate 
the relationship anonymously and send their responses to a neutral external 
party, a university. In the second phase of data collection, every purchasing 
officer that participated in the study (n=28) evaluated 4 suppliers. The proce-
dure for data collection from purchasing officers was the same as for suppliers. 
The e-mail invitations for an online survey contained an URL link to the Web 
site hosting the survey, as well as a unique username and password for each 
respondent. We also carefully planned reminders to increase the response 
rate; we sent reminders at times our respondents might feel more inclined to 
complete it, Monday mornings and Friday afternoons, that is when they might 
have some time to perform a work-unrelated activity. Respondents were also 
offered a report of the results as an incentive. Furthermore, they received a pdf 
version of the survey to prepare themselves before answering the questions 
online. Of the 254 suppliers invited to participate, 185 responded, for a re-
sponse rate of 72.83%. This dataset was used for study 1 and study 2. For study 
3 we needed the dyadic dataset. To collect the data from the buyer side of the 
dyad, of the 185 suppliers 28 purchasing officers were allowed to choose 4 
suppliers, in sum 112 suppliers for evaluation, from which 9 were deleted due 
to incomplete responses, resulting in a response rate of 91.96%. This approach 
is similar to other dyadic studies where purchasing officers themselves select 
the supplier to be evaluated or the supplier contact person provides contact 
details of their customers (Homburg and Stock, 2004; Jap, 1999; Johnston, 
McCutcheon, Stuart and Kerwood, 2004; Perrone, Zaheer and McEvily, 2003; 
Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003; Selnes and Sallis, 2003). Furthermore, to 
evaluate non-response bias, we used a time-trend extrapolation test and found 
no significant differences between early and late respondents (Armstrong and 
Overton, 1977).    12 
1.4.3  Description of the Database 
This section provides a first description of our database. We therefore highlight 
some critical key characteristics of the buyer and supplier samples. More so-
phisticated check-ups of the database and measures will follow later in this 
dissertation. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the most important characteristics 
of the companies in our sample. The table compares the buyer and supplier 
data points in terms of business-to-business (B2B) cooperation duration be-
tween companies and person-to-business (P2B) between company representa-
tives and a partner company as well as sales level, supplier turnover and buyer 
purchase spend.  
 
Table 1.2 gives an overview of the most relevant characteristics of the buyer 
and supplier data points in the database. The table compares a total sample of 
185 suppliers to a dyadic sample of matched pairs of 103 data points from a 
buyer and suppliers. Based on the comparison criteria, we can infer that buyers 
and suppliers are similar in terms of business-to-business collaboration length. 
However, buyer sample reveals that purchasing officers collaborate with the 
same supplying company much shorter than a key account manager with the 
same buying company.  
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B2B Relationship Length in years     
< 3   10.3  9.7  9.7 
> 3-5   15.2  14.6  13.6 
> 5-10   24.5  36.9  27.2 
> 10-15   19.6  18.4  15.5 
> 15   30.4  20.4  34.0 
     
P2B Relationship Length in years     
< 3   25.0  71.3  21.4 
> 3-5   18.5  16.8  17.5 
> 5-10   28.8  5.9  33.0 
> 10-15   14.7  5.9  13.6 
> 15   13.0  0.0  14.6 
     
Supplier Turnover/Purchasing 
Spend/Sales Level in mln Euros   
< 0,25  0.0  22.2  10.7 
> 0,25-1  5.0  42.9  16.5 
> 1-2   6.2  20.6  17.5 
> 2-6   12.4  14.3  22.3 
> 6-10   11.8  0.0  5.8 
> 10-80   39.1  0.0  13.6 
> 80  25.5  0.0  13.6 
 
1.5 Dissertation  Outline 
This dissertation contains three empirical studies that pursue our research 
objectives. Each study presents a theoretical logic developed based on insights 
from social capital, network and information systems research in the area of 
purchasing and supply chain management. To examine the hypotheses built 
upon the three conceptual frameworks, we set up data collection through two 
surveys. Table 1.2 offers a summary of the outline of the chapters.   14 
Table 1.2 Overview of chapters 
Chapter Study  Objective  Research  Context 
1  Introduction  
2  Study 1: Some Buyers Are More 
Equal Than Others: How Social 
Capital Affects Preferential Treat-
ment By Suppliers 
Examine the role of close 
social relationships in gaining 
preferential benefits (supplier 
perspective) 
164 independent 
suppliers in a 
buyer-supplier 
relationship in a 
manufacturing 
industry 
3  Study 2: It Takes Two to Tango: A 
Dyadic View on Customization and 
Its Outcomes 
Examine the impact of close 
social relationships on cus-
tomization and its outcomes 
(dyadic perspective) 
103 matched pairs 
of buyers and 
suppliers in a 
buyer-supplier 
relationship in a 
manufacturing 
industry 
4  Study 3: Man vs Machine: The 
Roles of Close Social Relationships 
and Enterprise Information Portal 
in Cross-Functional Information 
Sharing Behavior and its Outcomes 
Examine the effect of close 
social relationships on cross-
functional information sharing 
behavior provided the use of 
an enterprise information 
portal (supplier perspective) 
185 suppliers in a 
buyer-supplier 
relationship in a 
manufacturing 
industry 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
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1.6 Appendix  1 
A List of Indicators in a Database 
  General Satisfaction 
1  Overall, we are very satisfied with the relationship we have with Buyer X/Supplier X. 
2  If we had to do it all over again, we would still choose this Buyer X as a customer/Supplier X as a 
supplier. 
3  We are very pleased with what Buyer X/Supplier X does for us. 
4  Our firm regrets the decision to do business with Buyer X /Supplier X. 
   
  Social Satisfaction 
1  The working relationship between our firm and Buyer X/SupplierX can be characterized by feelings
of opposition. 
2  Buyer X/Supplier X expresses criticism tactfully. 
3  Interactions between our firm and Buyer X/Supplier X are characterized by mutual respect. 
4  Buyer X/Supplier X leaves our firm in the dark about things that we should know. 
5  Buyer X/Supplier X does not want to explain their working procedures to us. 
   
  Economic Satisfaction (Part 1) 
1  Buyer X/Supplier X provides our firm with support of high quality. 
2  Buyer X/Supplier X provides competent resources for problem solving. 
3  Buyer X/Supplier X provides resources for problem solving at the right time. 
   
  Economic Performance (Economic Satisfaction Part 2) 
1  The relationship with Buyer X/Supplier X has provided our firm with a profitable market position. 
2  Through the relationship with Buyer X/Supplier X we were able to attract other customers. 
3  The supplier improvement programs of Buyer X help us to perform better./ The supplier improve-
ment programs provided by Buyer X help Supplier X to perform better. 
   
  Affective Commitment 
1  It is pleasant working with Buyer X /Supplier X that is why we continue the relationship. 
2  We want to remain a supplier to Buyer X/a customer to Supplier X. 
3  Our decision to remain a supplier for Buyer X/customer of Supplier X is based on our attraction to 
the things that Buyer X/ Supplier X represents as a company (e.g., image, brand, reference). 
   
  General Commitment 
1  The relationship that our firm has with Buyer X/Supplier X is something we are very committed to.  
   
  Dependence (Calculative Commitment) 
1  There is too much effort (time and/or energy and/or expense) in switching to another customer/ 
supplier, that is why we stay with Buyer X/Supplier X.   16 
2  Right now staying with Buyer X/Supplier X is a matter of necessity since no feasible alternatives 
exist.   
3  It would be hard for us to transfer the investments we have made in support of Buyer X to another 
customer/Supplier X to another supplier, so we continue the relationship. 
4  It is too difficult to switch to another customer/supplier because of the lack of good alternatives, 
therefore we stay with Buyer X/ Supplier X; otherwise, we would consider leaving.    
   
  A Close Social Relationship 
1  Our employees share close social relations with the employees from Buyer X/Supplier X. 
2  We feel indebted to Buyer X/Supplier X for what they have done for us. 
3  We expect that we will be working with Buyer X/Supplier X far into the future. 
   
  A Perception of A Close Social Relationship 
1  Buyer X/Supplier X feels indebted to our company as a supplier for what we have done for them. 
2  Buyer X/Supplier X employees share close social relations with our employees.  
3  Buyer X/Supplier X expects that we will be working together far into the future. 
   
  Trust 
1  We can count on Buyer X/Supplier X to follow through on their commitments. 
2  Hidden motives are not a concern in this relationship with Buyer X/Supplier X. 
3  When making decisions, Buyer X/Supplier X considers our business interest as well as its own. 
4  We trust that Buyer X/Supplier X keeps our best interest in mind. 
5  Buyer X/Supplier X is honest with us. 
   
  Enterprise Information Portal 
1  All forecasts that can be found on EIP are clear. 
2  All forecasts that can be found on EIP are reliable. 
3  All specifications that can be found on EIP are clear. 
4  All specifications that can be found on EIP are reliable. 
5  All drawings that can be found on EIP are clear. 
6  All drawings that can be found on EIP are reliable. 
7  All pricelists that can be found on EIP are clear. 
8  All pricelists that can be found on EIP are reliable. 
9  All quality rejection data that can be found on EIP are clear. 
10  All quality rejection data that can be found on EIP are reliable. 
   
  Direct Contact Accessibility 
1  We have problems in accessing our contact persons from the following Buyer X/ Supplier depart-
ments: Engineering 
2  We have problems in accessing our contact persons from the following Buyer X/ Supplier depart-
ments: Production 
3  We have problems in accessing our contact persons from the following Buyer X/ Supplier depart-
ments: Quality (SQA) 17 
4  We have problems in accessing our contact persons from the following Buyer X/ Supplier depart-
ments: Purchasing 
5  We have problems in accessing our contact persons from the following Buyer X/ Supplier depart-
ments: Accounting 
   
  Preferential Treatment 
1  Buyer X/Supplier X receives special treatment from us. 
2  Buyer X /Supplier X receives invitations to special internal events (internal managerial meetings, 
engineering day, customer day) organized by our company 
3  Buyer X/Supplier X receives special information from us. 
   
  Preferential Structural Benefits 
1  Buyer X/Supplier X receives special value-added benefits from us (e.g., inventory control, expediting, 
training). 
2  We have made specific investments for Buyer X (e.g. EDI, packaging, delivery, KANBAN)/Supplier X 
(EDI, packaging quantity, delivery terms, kanban). 
3  We adapt our procedures to Buyer X/Supplier X requirements. 
4  We assigned additional dedicated personnel to Buyer X/Supplier X. 
   
  Supplier Evaluation (only a supplier's perspective thus not applicable for buyer sample) 
1  Buyer X sets clear improvement targets. 
2  Buyer X uses a formal procedure to evaluate our performance (e.g. audits, quality and/ or delivery
measurement).  
3  We are recognized by Buyer X for the improvements we realize. 
1  We have been certified to work with Buyer X. 
   
  Relationship Investments: Buyer and Supplier Development 
1  Buyer X visits our site to assess our processes./Supplier X visits our sites to familiarize themselves 
with our processes. 
2  We receive training from Buyer X./We receive training from Supplier X. 
3  We are early involved in the new product development process of Buyer X/Supplier X. 
4  Buyer X/Supplier X standardizes product specifications together with us. 
5  Buyer X/Supplier X collaborates with us to improve our manufacturing processes. 
6  Buyer X/Supplier X gives us technological advice (e.g. on materials, software). 
7  Buyer X/Supplier X gives us product development advice (e.g., on processes, project management).  
8  Buyer X/Supplier X gives us quality related advice (e.g., on the use of inspection equipment, quality 
assurance procedures).  
   
  Power 
1  We are confronted with strong penalties when violating Buyer X’s/Supplier X's procedures.  
2  Buyer X/Supplier X can pretty much dictate how well we produce the product. 
3  Buyer X/Supplier X has a significant influence on our operations. 
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4  In the past 6 months, Buyer X/Supplier X has changed and/ or influenced our programs and/ or
procedures and/ or policies.  
   
  Payment and contract terms 
1  Contracts are fair. 
2  Agreements are fair. 
3  Buyer X is paying according to agreements. / Supplier X is invoicing us correctly according agree-
ments. 
4  Payment terms are fair. 
5  Doing business with Buyer X/Supplier X is profitable. 
6  Supplier X sends us invoices on time 
   
  Total Company Turnover 
1  What is your company total turnover in millions of euro? 
   
  Person-to-business (P2B) Relationship Length 
1  How long have you, as a representative of your firm, been cooperating with Buyer X/Supplier X? 
   
  Business-to-business (B2B) Relationship Length 
1  How long has your company been a supplier to Buyer X/a customer of Supplier X? 
   
  Supplier Satisfaction with Feedback  
1  Mean for question 1: We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following Buyer X
departments about our quality performance. (departments are combined here) 
2  Mean for question 2: We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following Buyer X
departments about our delivery performance. (departments are combined here) 
3  Mean for question 3: We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following Buyer X
departments about our product development performance. (departments are combined here) 
4  Mean for question 4: We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following Buyer X 
departments about our process development performance. (departments are combined here) 
5  Mean for question 5: We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following Buyer X
departments about the invoicing and payment status. (departments are combined here) 
6  Mean for question 6: We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following Buyer X
departments about our total cost reduction performance. (departments are combined here) 
7  Mean for question 7: In general feedback from the following Buyer X departments is on time. (de-
partments are combined here) 
8  Mean for question 8: In general feedback from the following Buyer X departments is reliable. (de-
partments are combined here) 
   
  Buyer Satisfaction with Feedback  
1  We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from Supplier X about their ability to meet our quality
requirements. 
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2  We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from Supplier X about their ability to meet agreed
delivery terms.  
3  We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from Supplier X about their ability to meet our prod-
uct development requirements. 
4  We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from Supplier X about their ability to meet our proc-
ess development requirements.  
5  We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from Supplier X about our invoices' and payment 
status.  
6  We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from Supplier X about their ability to meet our total
cost reduction requirements. 
7  In general feedback from Supplier X is on time.  
8  In general feedback from Supplier X is reliable.  
   
  Buyer Cross-Functional Information Sharing Behavior 
  Departments: engineering, production, quality, purchasing and accounting 
  Communication Quality 
1  Mean for question 1: The communication of the following Buyer X  departments with our company 
is on time. (departments are combined here) 
2  Mean for question 2: The communication of the following Buyer X  departments with our company 
is accurate. (departments are combined here) 
3  Mean for question 3: The communication of the following Buyer X  departments with our company 
is complete. (departments are combined here) 
4  Mean for question 4: The communication of the following Buyer X  departments with our company 
is satisfactory. (departments are combined here) 
5  Mean for question 5: The communication of the following Buyer X  departments with our company 
is reliable. (departments are combined here) 
  Participation 
1  Mean for question 1: The following Buyer X departments ask us for our advice. (departments are 
combined here) 
2  Mean for question 2: The following Buyer X departments ask us to participate in goal setting. (de-
partments are combined here) 
3  Mean for question 3: The following Buyer X departments ask us to participate in planning activities. 
(departments are combined here) 
4  Mean for question 4: The following Buyer X departments encourage us to come with suggestions for 
improvements. (departments are combined here) 
5  Mean for question 5: The following Buyer X departments ask us to participate in forecasting activi-
ties. (departments are combined here) 
6  Mean for question 6: The following Buyer X departments are collaborative. (departments are com-
bined here) 
  Information Sharing 
1  Mean for question 1: The following Buyer X departments inform us in advance about their changing 
needs. (departments are combined here) 
2  Mean for question 2: The following Buyer X departments are providing us with all the information 
we need to serve them best. (departments are combined here) 
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3  Mean for question 3: Buyer X keeps us informed about events that may affect our company. (de-
partments are combined here) 
4  Mean for question 4: Buyer X keeps us informed about changes that may affect our company.
(departments are combined here) 
5  Mean for question 5: The information provided by the different Buyer X departments is reliable. 
(departments are combined here) 
   
  Supplier Information Sharing Behavior 
  Communication Quality 
1  The communication of Supplier X with our company is on time.  
2  The communication of Supplier X with our company is accurate.  
3  The communication of Supplier X with our company is complete.  
4  The communication of Supplier X with our company is satisfactory. 
5  The communication of Supplier X with our company is reliable.  
  Participation 
1  Supplier X asks us for our advice.  
2  Supplier X asks us to participate in goal setting.  
3  Supplier X asks us to participate in planning activities. 
4  Supplier X encourages us to come with suggestions for improvements.  
5  Supplier X asks us to participate in forecasting activities. 
6  Supplier X is collaborative.  
  Information Sharing 
1  Supplier X informs us in advance about their changing needs.  
2  Supplier X is providing us with all the information we need to serve them best.  
3  Supplier X keeps us informed about events that may affect our company.  
4  Supplier X keeps us informed about changes that may affect our company. 
5  The information provided by Supplier X is reliable.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Some Buyers Are More Equal Than Others: 
How Social Capital Affects Preferential 
Treatment By Suppliers
1 
Drawing on social capital theory, the authors investigate the role of three social 
capital dimensions—structural, relational, and cognitive—in providing benefits 
to both parties in a buyer–supplier relationship. According to suppliers, invest-
ments in supplier development will prompt preferential benefits for a buyer only 
if social capital exists. This finding extends existing social capital models by 
demonstrating the mediating effect of social capital between investments and 
benefits and revealing different drivers of social capital. This study also contrib-
utes to investigations of the effects of supplier development by focusing on its 
influence on preferential treatment by suppliers. In contrast with other social 
capital theory studies, this research includes benefits for both sides of the 
buyer–supplier relationship and shows that if suppliers grant preferences to a 
buyer, they generate increased sales and economic performance. 
 
                                                             
1 This study is in the second round at Journal of Operations Management   22 
2.1 Introduction 
Suppliers implement key account management and customer relationship pro-
grams to enhance their performance and competitive position by fostering 
close, strong relationships with important buyers in their customer portfolio 
(Ryals and Rogers, 2007). Despite widespread research on buyer–supplier rela-
tionships though, we lack sufficient understanding of how close and strong 
relationships influence suppliers’ behavior, including their choices with regard 
to specific buyers and the benefits of these choices. We build on social capital 
theory to introduce the concept of “preferential buyer benefits,” granted ex-
clusively to a specific buyer but not other buyers in the supplier’s customer 
portfolio. These benefits involve preferential treatment, exchanges of unique 
information, and personal invitations from the supplier to join special internal 
events (e.g., management meetings, engineering workshops, seminars, train-
ing). 
According to social theory, these preferential benefits are uncertain (Blau, 
1964), because suppliers cannot be forced to provide preferential treatment 
but instead voluntarily choose to do so (Das and Teng, 2002). Buyers prefer to 
decrease such uncertainty and safeguard their preferential benefits from key 
suppliers by investing in the relationship, perhaps through supplier develop-
ment (SD; Krause, Handfield and Scannell, 1998; Krause et al., 2007; Krause et 
al., 2000; Wagner, 2006a, 2006b). Supplier development involves evaluating 
supplier performance and then helping them improve their operational proc-
esses directly. For example, by investing significant resources in their key sup-
pliers’ development, Toyota and Honda obtained “customer of choice” status 
(Milas, 2006; Sako, 2004). A manufacturing company similarly might send a SD 
team to the supplier’s work site to provide process, technological and/or qual-
ity-related advice. Suppliers also could participate in training workshops organ-
ized by the buyer or collaborate early in new product development processes. 
Yet not all SD investments bring the expected outcomes (Krause et al., 2000), 
which suggests that some buyers may be more equal than others. By investi-
gating suppliers’ responses to SD initiatives, we attempt to clarify the role of 
social capital for prompting preferential treatment from suppliers.  
We thus make several contributions to extant literature. First, from a theo-
retical perspective, we extend existing models of social capital by proposing 23 
relationships among social capital dimensions (e.g., structural and relational 
capital) that derive from commitment-trust theory rather than the dominant 
network theory. We also empirically test Adler and Kwon’s (2002) claim that 
social capital mediates resource exchanges by acting as an asset that receives 
resource support (e.g., SD) and might lead to the provision of other resources 
or benefits (e.g., preferential buyer benefits). In that respect, we respond to 
Moran’s (2005) request for investigations of various, carefully distinguished 
drivers of social capital. We thus extend research designs and analytical ap-
proaches to buyer–supplier relationships. 
Second, from a practical perspective, most SD studies have focused on the 
effects on manufacturing performance (e.g., Carr and Kaynak, 2007; Krause et 
al., 1998; Krause et al., 2007; Krause et al., 2000; Modi and Mabert, 2007; 
Rogers et al., 2007; Wagner, 2006a, 2006b; Wagner and Johnson, 2004), but 
buying companies affirm that they should be gaining something in return from 
suppliers as well. We therefore respond with research on supplying behavior, 
with an explicit focus on preferential treatment. In our study suppliers provide 
insights into what triggers them to allocate preferential resources to buyers, 
and by taking this supply-side perspective (e.g., Prahinski and Benton, 2004), 
we complement studies from the buyer’s perspective.  
Third, studies on social capital theory primarily have referred to benefits 
obtained by one party in a buyer–supplier relationship (Krause et al., 2007; 
Lawson et al., 2008; e.g., Min et al., 2008, p. 287). We instead present a model 
that includes both a supplier’s (sales, economic performance) and a buyer’s 
(preferential benefits) benefits. Therefore, our study bridges the research gap 
that marks the role of social capital in resource exchanges and the effects of SD 
on actual preferential supplying behaviors (preferential buyer benefits).  
We next provide a brief introduction of social capital theory, and then de-
velop our hypotheses pertaining to social capital’s mediating role between 
investments in supplier development and buyer–supplier relationship benefits. 
After we describe our research setting, the data, its collection, and the meas-
ures, we present our analytical approach and hypotheses tests. We elaborate 
on our findings in the discussion section. Finally, we provide managerial impli-
cations and directions for further research.   24 
2.2  Social Capital Theory 
To date, social capital theory has served as an attractive method for explaining 
various socially related, cooperative behaviors between people and organiza-
tions (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Tsai, 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Lately, it also has 
gained significant attention in supply chain studies (e.g., Krause et al., 2007; 
Lawson et al., 2008; Min et al., 2008). Social capital consists of three dimen-
sions: (1) relational, (2) structural, and (3) cognitive capital (Nahapiet and Gho-
shal, 1998), which enhance access to and exchanges of resources (Wasko-
McLure and Faraj, 2005), resulting in value creation for the parties involved in a 
buyer–supplier relationship (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Various scholars 
continue to conceptualize and operationalize social capital differently (e.g., in 
Adler and Kwon, 2002; Krause et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2008), though they 
share a common understanding of its potential benefits.  
Specifically, social capital is not only a valuable asset in itself (Granovetter, 
1992) but also creates more value for buyers and suppliers by providing access 
to resources and unique opportunities (Uzzi, 1996). Social capital contributes to 
building competitive advantages. unlike other types of capital, such as physical, 
financial, or human, social capital is unique to the organization and the particu-
lar buyer–supplier relationship (Coleman, 1988). Therefore, it is difficult to 
extract value from it outside the context of that organization or relationship 
(Moran, 2005; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Furthermore, similarly to other 
types of capital, social capital is an asset, thus, resources can be invested in it 
along with the expectation of future benefits (Adler and Kwon, 2002, p. 21). 
Finally, the expectation of reciprocity is present in both social capital theory 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002; Portes, 1998) and social exchange theory (Noordewier 
and Nevin, 1990; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).  
These characteristics suggest social capital provides an appropriate theo-
retical framework for studying buyer–supplier relationships. It can reveal value, 
in terms of the benefits buyers and suppliers might earn from investing in a 
relationship, and it recognizes the unique preferential advantage that the buyer 
can obtain as a benefit of its resource investments (Portes, 1998). Therefore, 
we position social capital as a mediator between buyer investments in SD and 
preferential buyer benefits provided by a supplier.  
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2.2.1  Benefits of Social Relationships 
Social capital derives from network theory and Granovetter’s (1985) study of 
social embeddedness in economic exchange. Although social capital as a whole 
offers access to preferential buyer benefits, Granovetter (1992) particularly 
underlines the important role of one of its dimensions, namely, structural capi-
tal. Various studies refer to this form with different names, including social 
interaction ties (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), social relationships (Coleman, 1990; 
Granovetter, 1992), closed networks of social relationships, close or strong ties 
(Coleman, 1988), and embeddedness (Moran, 2005). The concept of structural 
capital refers to the advantages of a network’s configuration, whether it con-
sists of weak, sparse, close, or dense ties (Moran, 2005). In turn, the benefits of 
structural capital relate closely to network closure theory (Moran, 2005), in 
which a tie refers to a social relationship between two actors (Seibert et al., 
2001). A strong social relationship demonstrates a higher level of closeness, 
reciprocity, and indebtedness compared with a weak social relationship (e.g., 
Granovetter, 1973; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Dense, close social rela-
tionships tend to be more beneficial than loose ones (Ahuja, 2000; Cohen, 
1988; Lin et al., 2001; Uzzi, 1997) by offering access to sensitive information 
(e.g., Granovetter, 1973), privileged information, or even privileged economic 
resources such as subsidized loans or protected markets (Coleman, 1988; 
Portes, 1998).  
We adopt the view that privileged access to resources results from a 
strong social relationship (Cook and Emerson, 1978). Furthermore, Rowely, 
Behrens and Krackhardt (2000, p. 371) claim that a strong social relationship 
governs behaviors in a relationship and therefore acts as a social control 
mechanism. A close, reciprocal, long-term–oriented social relationship should 
govern suppliers’ behavior in terms of whether they grant buyers access to 
specific privileges.  
2.2.2  Developing a Social Relationship 
However, a strong social relationship (structural capital) is not readily or widely 
available for exploitation; it first must be developed (Portes, 1998). This devel-
opment can take two forms. First, according to the guanxi  (i.e., bonding) ap-  26 
proach, a strong social relationship results from trust and commitment (Chen 
and Chen, 2004; Ramasamy, Goh and Yeung, 2006). High levels of trust and 
commitment not only characterize strong relationships (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 
1987; Jap, Manolis and Weitz, 1999) but also provide important supports for 
relationship establishment and maintenance (Berry and Parasuraman, 1991; 
Palmer, 2002). Furthermore, trust and commitment distinguish social from 
economic exchanges by binding the parties more closely (McDonald, 1981). 
Thus, a strong social relationship (structural capital) is a result of trust and 
commitment (relational capital). Second, a social relationship can emerge 
“through investment strategies” (Portes, 1998, p. 3) or resource commitments 
(Rowley et al., 2000), which might include supplier development investments.  
2.3  Social Capital, Supplier Development, and Benefits 
Adler and Kwon (2002) state that social capital is an asset in itself, which ex-
tends the social capital definition and thus requires empirical testing. We build 
on their claim to offer theoretical support for the idea that social capital not 
only enables investments but is also enforced by them. Accordingly, we present 
a series of hypotheses (see Figure 2.1) that examine the interplay among social 
capital dimensions, investments, and benefits. We start by analyzing the effects 
of buyer investments (i.e., SD) on the actual benefits for the buyer, which con-
sist of supplier investments in the relationship (i.e., preferential buyer bene-
fits). We then suggest some effects of social capital enforcement through in-
vestments and relations among the three dimensions of social capital (rela-
tional, structural, and cognitive), which also may boost the benefits for the 
buyer. Finally, we consider whether the benefits granted from a supplier to a 
buyer (preferential buyer benefits) generate value for that supplier (sales and 









2.3.1  Linking Supplier Development and Preferential Buyer Benefits 
Supplier development (SD) generally has been studied as a resource commit-
ment that attempts to improve relationship outcomes for both the buyer and 
the supplier (e.g., Krause et al., 2007; Vondermbse and Tracey, 1999). Accord-
ing to these studies, SD comprises “goal setting, supplier evaluation, perform-
ance measurement, supplier training” and other related practices (Krause et al., 
2007, p. 529). We categorize the concept on the basis of the buyer’s involve-
ment in the supplier’s core processes, as well as the complexity of its imple-
mentation (based on Sanchez-Rodriguez, Hemsworth and Martinez-Lorente, 
2005).  
Thus, SD consists of three dimensions: supplier evaluation, operational 
supplier development, and strategic supplier development. Supplier evaluation 
corresponds to indicators of the requirements suppliers must fulfill (e.g., tar-
gets, certificates). The buyer regularly measures suppliers according to those 
indicators and recognizes those who fulfill them. Operational supplier devel-
opment refers to activities carried out at the supplier’s site that are designed to 
improve the “supplier capabilities (e.g., technology, production, process, qual-
ity) for long-term mutual benefit of both parties” (Hahn, Watts and Kim, 1990, 
p. 3). Finally, strategic supplier development represents investments that are 
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complex to implement by the buyer. For our study, strategic SD entails early 
supplier involvement in new product and process developments and supplier 
training, such that the buyer is deeply involved in the core processes of the 
supplier and goes beyond realizing basic operational improvements. 
According to prior research on buyer–supplier relationships, parties make 
investments that may provide future benefits in the form of superior value 
(Briggs, Landry and Daugherty, 2007; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). To keep 
balance in the relationship over time (Noordewier and Nevin, 1990; Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1992), a supplier must reciprocate investments made by the buyer 
(Shipilov, Rowley and Aharonson, 2006). Thus, these who own resources and 
invest them in supplier development increase profitability (Dyer, 1996). We 
expect that reciprocation of the buyer’s investments takes the form of prefer-
ential buyer benefits, exclusively granted by the supplier to a specific buyer in 
the form of unique treatments, special information and participation in special 
internal events. We hypothesize: 
 
H1: Supplier development relates positively to preferential buyer benefits. 
2.3.2  Linking Supplier Development and Social Capital  
Because social capital consists of three dimensions, we discuss separately how 
SD influences (1) relational capital, (2) structural capital, and (3) cognitive capi-
tal.  
According to social exchange theory, parties make relational investments 
to express their trustworthiness (Hallen et al., 1991). Weitz and Jap (1995) indi-
cate that such investments create trust, which is an important component of 
relational capital (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), as is commitment (Wasko-McLure 
and Faraj, 2005). Relational capital represents the affective nature of a rela-
tionship (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), or relationship quality (Bolino, Turnley 
and Bloodgood, 2002), and it consists of trust and commitment as its two di-
mensions. Commitment is critical in buyer–supplier relationships because it 
reflects the desire to continue a relationship that offers perceived value 
(Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman, 1993). Because SD is a resource commit-
ment to improve the relationship and make it more valuable, it should enhance 
the supplier’s commitment to investing in the buyer due to its desire to con-29 
tinue the relationship with that investing buyer. When a buyer invests re-
sources in SD, we expect the investments to be perceived as efforts to increase 
the supplier’s trust and commitment and hypothesize:  
 
H2: Supplier development relates positively to relational capital. 
 
With regard to structural capital, Wasko-McLure and Faraj (2005) refer to it as 
dense connections or a high proportion of direct social ties, whereas other 
researchers conceptualize it as social interaction ties, measured according to 
close contacts and time spent during social occasions (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) note the ongoing debate about the conceptu-
alization and components of strong ties (a strong social relationship; Seibert et 
al., 2001) and use Granovetter’s (1973) view of strong ties as the structure of a 
social network (“strong linkages between supply chain members”; Chen and 
Paulraj, 2004a, p.125) to develop their concept of relational embeddedness. 
Combining Granovetter’s (1973) notion of a strong tie with Tsai and Ghoshal’s 
(1998) view, we propose that structural capital involves a close, reciprocal, 
long-term–oriented social relationship between a buying and a supplying com-
pany. As structural capital between a buyer and  supplier is “constructed 
through investment strategies” (Portes, 1998, p. 3) or resource commitments 
(Rowley et al., 2000), a buyer that invests resources in SD should create struc-
tural capital. In other words, SD should result in a close, reciprocal, long-term–
oriented social relationship, and we hypothesize: 
 
H3: Supplier development relates positively to structural capital. 
 
Finally, buyer–supplier interactions enhance sharing goals and values, or cogni-
tive capital (McFarland, Bloodgood and Payan, 2008). Cognitive capital repre-
sents shared interpretations and meanings, that originate from participation in 
setting mutual goals and plans for the relationship’s shared future (Wasko-
McLure and Faraj, 2005). By committing resources to SD, a buyer interacts with 
the supplier to build such a shared future (Heide and John, 1990). Therefore, 
we claim that when a buyer invests resources in SD and works with the supplier 
to improve relationship performance at the organizational level, the buyer   30 
should develop more cognitive capital (shared visions, plans, and goals) with 
the supplier; that is, 
 
H4: Supplier development relates positively to cognitive capital. 
2.3.3  Relations of Social Capital Dimensions  
Existing research on relationships predominantly relies on the concept of em-
beddedness (Granovetter, 1992). Both network theory and social capital stud-
ies influence prior research, which  places close social and reciprocal relation-
ships (structural capital) as antecedents of relational capital (trust and com-
mitment; e.g., Lawson et al., 2008; Rooks, Raub and Tazelaar, 2006; Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). We instead suggest that a strong social relationship 
develops through relational capital, not vice versa, consistent with extant stud-
ies (Berry and Parasuraman, 1991; Gu, Hung and Tse, 2008; Ramasamy et al., 
2006). For the purpose of this study, we define trust as the supplier’s percep-
tion of honesty, including its confidence in the reliability and integrity of the 
buyer (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), and its motivation to rely on that confidence 
(Moorman et al., 1993). Commitment is the supplier’s psychological feeling-
based attachment to a buyer (Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer and Kumar, 1996). 
In line with Palmer (2002), we propose to take the view that these social phe-
nomena explain the formation of strong, close, reciprocal, long-term–oriented 
social relationships and hypothesize:  
 
H5: Relational capital relates positively to structural capital. 
 
Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) further propose that structural capital influences posi-
tively cognitive capital. This is the case since a close social relationship helps 
partners realize and adopt collective goals and plans. However, the linkage is 
not significant in their study. We also consider the possibility of the opposite 
relationship, such that an attractive shared future may motivate the develop-
ment of collaborations (Spekman, 1988). However, building a strong (Kendrick, 
2004, p. 142) and close (Heide and John, 1990; Jap, 1999) relationship demands 
that parties act jointly to create shared goals and plans (Anderson and Jap, 
2005). Therefore, the more a cooperative course of action toward shared fu-31 
ture exists between a buyer and a supplier, the stronger, closer, and more re-
ciprocal their long-term–oriented relationships should be: 
 
H6: Cognitive capital relates positively to structural capital.  
2.3.4  Linking Social Capital and Preferential Buyer Benefits  
Social capital provides access to a variety of benefits. We prioritize privileged 
access to resources as the most important benefit (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 
1998). Further, for the purpose of this study we incorporate Uzzi’s (1997) find-
ings about preferred treatment into our concept of preferential buyer benefits. 
Preferential buyer benefits imply a priority status in the supplier’s customer 
portfolio compared to competitors. These benefits, typically take the form of 
the supplier’s efforts to customize dyadic exchanges with unique treatment, 
invitations to special social events and sharing unique information. Jap (1999) 
suggests that preferential buyer benefits from close, reciprocal buyer–supplier 
relationships enhances the company’s competitiveness over its rivals. In line 
with social capital theory, we posit that a supplier that has a strong social rela-
tionship with a buyer grants that buyer privileged access to resources. There-
fore, the quality of the relationship (trust and commitment) affects access to 
resources through the social relationship (i.e. structural capital; (e.g., Moran, 
2005). Therefore,  
 
H7: Structural capital relates positively to preferential buyer benefits. 
 
Furthermore, sharing the same perceptions about the future of the relation-
ship, including collective goals and plans, allows parties to interpret events in 
similar ways (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). The collective view regulates their 
interactions and facilitates communication, helping recognize the prospective 
value of their resource exchanges (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Therefore, when 
the future goals and plans of a buyer and a supplier are well aligned, suppliers 
are motivated to invest in the buyer to capture the full potential of the rela-
tionship (Jap, 1999). A supplier involved in creating a shared future with a 
buyer should be more willing to treat that buyer in an exclusive manner, com-
pared with other buyers that compete for the same resources. The supplier   32 
then would share special information with and make specific investments in 
the buyer. We hypothesize: 
 
H8: Cognitive capital relates positively to preferential buyer benefits. 
 
According to Uzzi (1997), trust also leads to preferred treatment. Yet Jap (1999) 
notes that any party’s motivation to provide resources depends on the quality 
of the relationships. Relationship quality usually appears as a multidimensional 
construct that consists of trust, commitment, satisfaction, and norms 
(Palmatier, 2008), similar to relational capital in social capital theory (Wasko - 
McLure and Faraj, 2005). We build on the premise that the core values of rela-
tionship quality and the relational dimension of social capital are trust and 
commitment. In line with commitment-trust theory, they also determine rela-
tionship performance (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Specifically, whether trust and 
commitment act together or in isolation, they should produce positive per-
formance outcomes (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Trust enhances a supplier’s 
willingness to share resources, including information (Ridings, Gefen and 
Arinze, 2002), without fear of opportunistic behaviors (Tsai, 2000; Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998). Additionally, commitment evokes a strong feeling of duty to 
assist the partner and make valuable contributions (Wasko-McLure and Faraj, 
2005). Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
H9: Relational capital relates positively to preferential buyer benefits. 
2.3.5  Linking Preferential Benefits and Value Creation 
Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) report that resource exchange also leads to the crea-
tion of value, that refers to not only innovations but also improved perform-
ance. Krause et al. (2007) study the influence of resource exchange on a 
buyer’s perceptions of performance improvement. Yet Moran and Ghoshal 
(1996) propose using resources in new ways to create value. For instance, the 
application of new ways to improve, either products or processes demands 
specific investments from the buyer. Rearranging resources and making specific 
investments thus may be associated with value creation (Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998). We focus on the supplier’s sales and economic benefits to measure the 33 
value that the supplier earns from granting preferential benefits to a buyer. In 
line with Portes (1998), we assess supplier economic performance according to 
positive outcomes derived from not only the relationship with a buyer (profit-
ability and improved performance) but also outside that relationship (profitable 
market position and customer attraction). In summary, increasing supplier 
benefits is not possible without unique investments in a relationship with a 
buyer (Anderson and Jap, 2005). We hypothesize: 
 
H10: Preferential buyer benefits relate positively to supplier sales. 
H11: Preferential buyer benefits relate positively to supplier economic benefits. 
2.3.6 Control  Variables 
We include relationship length as a control variable because, as Subramani 
(2004) suggests, doing so enables us to control for its effects on benefits as well 
as for recursive relationships that would confound the results if they existed 
(Jap and Ganesan, 2000). We also consider the buyer’s power (Mohr, Fisher 
and Nevin, 1996; Narasimhan, Nair, Griffith, Arlbjörn and Bendloy, 2009). 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Research  Setting 
We selected the suppliers of a single, core buying company as potential partici-
pants in the empirical study, to exclude contextual effects and allow for a single 
frame of reference. These suppliers evaluated how they granted preferential 
buyer benefits to the buying company, compared with to the population of 
their other buyers. Since social theory considers benefits as uncertain and vol-
untary (Blau, 1964; Das and Teng, 2002). Thus, we chose to analyze our model 
at the part of the sample that was not dependent on the buyer (164 of 185 
suppliers, see chapter 1). We adapted a measure of the supplier’s dependence 
from scales used by Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) and thereby divided the 
sample according to the level of dependence.    34 
2.4.2 Sample  Demographics 
Of the 185 respondents, 43.48% had a short-term relationship (< 5 years) with 
the buyer, 43.48% had a medium-term relationship of up to 15 years, and 
13.04% had a long-term relationship (> 15 years). Their company-to-company 
collaboration durations showed that 25.54% had a short-term (< 5 years), 
44.1% had a medium-term (5–15 years), and 30.36% had a long-term (>15 
years) relationship.  
2.4.3 Measurement  Instruments 
The survey included a set of items measured on seven-point Likert-type scales,  
of agreement ranging from 1 = “completely disagree” to 7 = “completely agree” 
(for relational capital, evaluation dimension of supplier development, structural 
capital, and economic benefits for the supplier), as well as seven-point Likert-
type scales ranging from 1 = “never” to 7 = “always” (for preferential benefits 
for the buyer, operational and strategic dimensions of supplier development, 
cognitive capital, and power). For both, theoretical and empirical considera-
tions, all the concepts we studied were reflective measures at both first- and 
second-order levels (Coltman, Devinney, Midgley and Venaik, 2008). All items 
from this study are presented in Appendix 2. 
Supplier Development was operationalized as a multidimensional con-
struct, that included supplier evaluation and operational and strategic supplier 
development that we adapted based on Krause et al. (2007), Sanchez-
Rodriguez et al. (2005) and Wagner (2006a), (2006b).  
Social capital also was a multidimensional construct consisting of rela-
tional, structural, and cognitive dimensions. Relational capital consisted of trust 
and commitment; Kaufman, Satish, and Randall (2006) provided the scales to 
measure trust, and the commitment scale comprised three items investigated 
by Kumar et al. (1994). The structural capital measurement included items 
introduced by Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001). For the cognitive capital meas-
ure, adapted from Mohr and Spekman (1994), we assessed scores for five de-
partments (engineering, production, quality, purchasing and accounting), then 
calculated a mean score for the analysis.  35 
The preferential buyer benefits scale was based on Palmatier et al. (2007). 
We also collected information about suppliers’ turnover and sales level. Turn-
over was an objective measure of the company’s total turnover; supplier sales 
level related to how much of the turnover, as a percentage, represented sales 
to the buying company. These two inputs provided supplier sales value. Sup-
plier economic performance was measured with scales from Geyskens and 
Steenkamp (2000).  
For the control variables, we measured the power of the buyer with a 
three-item construct we adapted from Mohr et al. (1996) and relationship 
length using the measure provided by Jap and Ganesan (2000).  
2.5 Findings 
2.5.1 Analysis  Approach 
We used partial least square (PLS) path modeling with latent variables, as im-
plemented in SmartPLS, to obtain the parameter estimates in the measure-
ment and structural models (Chin, 1998; Ringle, 2006a; Ringle, Wende and Will, 
2005, 2007). Before beginning the path modeling, we followed the guidelines 
proposed by Marcoulides and Saunders (2006), and we evaluated the distribu-
tional properties of our manifest variables using the NORMTEST macro devel-
oped by DeCarlo (1997). Assessing univariate normality, we found that most of 
our measures did not exceed |3| for skewness (√b1) and kurtosis (b2-3). How-
ever, univariate normality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for assess-
ing normality, because it is a weaker assumption than multivariate normality 
(DeCarlo, 1997). Small’s test of multivariate skewness (Q1 = 490.71, p < .01) 
and multivariate kurtosis (VQ2 = 575.97, p < .01) indicated violations of the 
multivariate normality assumption (DeCarlo, 1997).  
We chose PLS path modeling, or component-based structural equation 
modeling (SEM), over covariance-based SEM due to its robustness with regard 
to multivariate normality and its limited constraints on the measurement levels 
of the manifest variables or sample size (Chin, 1998; Tenenhaus, Vinzi, Chatelin 
and Lauro, 2005). A component-based SEM approach also allows for the appli-  36 
cation of complex models that include many constructs and indicators and/or 
relationships (Chin, 1998). 
To test for mediation effects, we followed the approach for conducting 
mediation analysis with SEM outlined by Iacobucci, Saldanha and Deng (2007), 
as well as a bootstrap-based method to obtain the standard errors for the indi-
rect effects (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). According to the results in Table 2.1, the 
direct path between relational capital and preferential buyer benefits was not 
significant, nor was the path between cognitive capital and preferential buyer 
benefits. However, structural capital fully mediated the relationship between 
relational capital and preferential buyer benefits (z = 2.26, p < .05) and that 
between cognitive capital and preferential buyer benefits (z = 1.86, p < .05). 
The relationship between supplier development and structural capital was not 
significant, but relational (z = 5.02, p < .01) and cognitive (z = 2.61, p < .01) capi-
tal fully mediated the relationship between supplier development and struc-
tural capital.  
 
Table 2.1 Intercorrelations of the Latent Variables 
a  
Construct  Mean  Sd 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Cognitive capital  4,47 1,41 0,86       
2. Supplier economic benefits  4,99 1,00 0,46 0,80      
3. Preferential buyer benefits  4,96 1,24 0,31 0,17 0,79     
4. Relational capital  5,79 0,81 0,43 0,67 0,12 0,71    
5. Structural capital  4,73 1,05 0,53 0,56 0,29 0,65 0,73   
6. Supplier development  3,05 1,15 0,70 0,39 0,28 0,43 0,48 0,75 
a
 Square root of AVE on the diagonal           
 
2.5.2 Psychometric  Properties 
The psychometric properties of the measurement instruments, as assessed by 
SmartPLS, included reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity 
(Tenenhaus et al., 2005). For empirical tests, the internal consistency and reli-
ability of reflective constructs can be assessed with composite reliability (CR) 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Wetzels, Odekerken-Schroder and van Oppen, 
2009), average variance extracted (AVE), and factor loadings (Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 1994). Similar standards apply to investigations of content, conver-37 
gent, and discriminant validity (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006). All CRs 
exceeded the cut-off value of .7, and the AVEs exceeded .5 (see Appendix 2). In 
support of convergent validity, every item’s standardized loading on its respec-
tive construct was greater than .5 (Hulland, 1999). When constructs shared 
more variance with their own measures than with other constructs in the 
model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), the value of the square root of the AVE ex-
ceeded the construct’s intercorrelations (see Table 2.1), and discriminant valid-
ity was satisfactory. 
As we collected our data using a survey questionnaire, we checked for 
common method variance (CMV), which may influence the modeled relation-
ships, using Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Specifically, 
we entered all the items together into a factor analysis (principal components 
analysis [PCA] with an unrotated solution). In case that a single factor solution 
emerged or one general factor accounted for most of the variance, CMV would 
pose a threat (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In our study, we included 45 items, 
and the PCA analysis produced a ten-factor solution. The first factor explained 
30.5% of the variance. The unrotated solution did not reveal one general fac-
tor. Therefore, CMV is not a concern.  
2.5.3 Hypotheses  Testing 
We found support for seven of our eleven hypotheses (Table 2.2). Contrary to 
our expectations, supplier development did not directly evoke preferential 
buyer benefits (H1) or structural capital (H3). As we expected though, SD in-
vestments influenced the creation of relational capital between a supplier and 
a buyer (H2). Furthermore, SD positively influenced cognitive capital (H4). Both 
relational capital (H5) and cognitive capital (H6) positively affected structural 
capital. Preferential buyer benefits were positively influenced by structural 
capital (H7) but not by cognitive capital (H8) or relational capital (H9). Finally, 
the effects of preferential buyer benefits on both supplier sales (H10) and sup-
plier economic performance (H11) were positive and significant. Of the control 
variables, power did not influence any variables, whereas relationship length 
positively influenced preferential buyer benefits and cognitive capital.  
To assess the fit of our data to the model in SmartPLS, we used the R² val-
ues of the endogenous constructs (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). According to Cohen   38 
(1988), values of R² of .02, .13, and .26 indicate small, medium and large effect 
sizes, respectively, of the treatment independent of sample sizes. The individ-
ual values for R² indicated that the model explained 51% of the variance in 
structural capital, 21% of preferential buyer benefits, 3% of supplier sales, and 
3% of supplier economic benefits (see Figure 2.2). Furthermore, the R² values 
for relational and cognitive capital were 19% and 50%. As a global fit measure, 
we used a formula developed by Tenenhaus et al. (2005). Relative to the me-
dium-sized effects in our model, the evaluated fit of .41 indicated a good fit of 
the data to the model (Wetzels et al., 2009).  
 
Table 2.2 Path Coefficients 
Path/Hypothesis Path  Coefficient  t-Value 
Supplier development -> Preferential buyer benefits (H1)  0.03    0.22 n.s. 
Supplier development -> Relational capital (H2)  0.44    5.81** 
Supplier development -> Structural capital (H3)  0.09    1.06 n.s.  
Supplier development -> Cognitive capital (H4)  0.68   13.29** 
Relational capital -> Structural capital (H5)  0.50    7.53** 
Cognitive capital -> Structural capital (H6)  0.24    2.60* 
Structural capital -> Preferential buyer benefits (H7)  0.26    2.34* 
Cognitive capital -> Preferential buyer benefits (H8)  0.11    0.89 n.s.  
Relational capital -> Preferential buyer benefits (H9)  -0.13    1.26 n.s. 
Preferential buyer benefits -> Supplier sales profits (H10)  0.18    3.27** 
Preferential buyer benefits -> Supplier economic performance (H11)  0.17    2.0* 
Second-order constructs       
Supplier development    
Supplier development -> Supplier evaluation  0.85   35.19** 
Supplier development -> Operational supplier development  0.96  141.86** 
Supplier development -> Strategic supplier development  0.91   57.94** 
Relational capital    
Relational capital -> Commitment  0.90   58.79** 
Relational capital -> Trust  0.90   52.96** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, one-tailed tests. n.s. = not significant. 39 
Figure 2.2 Empirical Findings 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, one-tailed tests, n.s. – not significant 
 
2.6  Discussion and Conclusions 
So far most of extant literature studying results of supplier development has 
focused on performance improvements (e.g., Krause et al., 2007; Modi and 
Mabert, 2007; Rogers et al., 2007). In the context of social capital theory, we 
instead have considered the results for both sides of the relationship. For the 
buyer, the anticipated outcomes include unique, preferential treatment and a 
privileged allocation of resources (i.e., preferential buyer benefits). For the 
supplier, the expected results involve sales increases and better economic per-
formance, including attraction of new customers. Our sample consists of sup-
pliers that do not depend on the buyer and thus, in accordance with social 
exchange theory, they offer preferential treatment voluntarily (Das and Teng, 
2002). It should come as no surprise that for these independent suppliers, a 
buyer’s investments in SD do not have direct influences on preferential benefits 
from the supplier (rejection of H1).  
Although SD investments also do not affect the formation of structural 
capital (rejection of H3), they have direct influences on relational and cognitive 
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support, since it increases its trust and commitment toward the buyer. In line 
with Joshi and Stump (1999), when a buyer invests in SD, it involves the sup-
plier in jointly building a shared future (cognitive capital). We also show that in 
order to receive preferential buyer benefits, the buyer needs to build structural 
capital. It can do so by developing trust and commitment (relational capital, 
H5) and a jointly built shared future (cognitive capital, H6), both of which result 
from SD investments. The findings thus indicate a bonding effect between a 
buyer and a supplier when a supplier trusts the buyer, is committed to the 
buyer, and is involved with the buyer in creating a collectively shared future.  
The formation of a social relationship through relational capital (H5) sup-
ports the concept of guanxi view and commitment-trust theory. Therefore, the 
findings offer an interesting view on social relationship formation, through 
trust and commitment that reverses the dominant view in network theory 
studies. Furthermore, in contrast with H8, involving the supplier in jointly build-
ing a shared future does not influence receiving preferential buyer benefits, nor 
does building trust and commitment, which contradicts H9. Preferential buyer 
benefits are only granted to the buyer if structural capital is created between 
the supplier and that buyer (H7), in support of Gu et al.’s (2008) assertion that 
social relationships have the power to influence the way that businesses are 
managed. This also highlights the superiority of a strong bond (structural capi-
tal) between a buyer and a supplier, in enhancing preferential behavior com-
pared with relational and cognitive capitals. Structural capital, therefore, repre-
sents the accumulation of social capital that embodies feelings of indebtedness 
(reciprocity), as an outcome of investments in supplier development 
(Gouldner, 1960). Finally, we confirm that awarding benefits to a buyer cre-
ates value for the supplier in terms of increased sales (H10) and economic per-
formance (H11).  
Furthermore, since the results indicate a lack of influence of power on any 
of the variables, we encourage buying companies to invest in supplier devel-
opment to increase their chances of receiving access to preferential benefits. In 
contrast, Ramsay and Wagner (2009) call SD inappropriate, claiming it never 
leads to preferred buyer status. Our study shows quite the opposite: supplier 
development leads to preferential benefits through the social capital dimen-41 
sions. Thus, the intermediary role of social capital in resource exchange and 
value creation, as suggested by Adler and Kwon (2002), receives support.  
2.7 Managerial  Implications 
This study provides several implications for buying firms that want to improve 
their competitive positioning in a supplier’s customer portfolio. The benefits of 
strong and close relationships appear in social theories (Putnam, 1995), with 
limited elaboration of their potential dark sides (Anderson and Jap, 2005). 
Many companies attempt to accomplish close collaborations with their suppli-
ers and invest heavily in supplier development with the expectation of a close 
relationship similar to Toyota’s with its suppliers (Milas, 2006). However, as our 
results indicate, SD investments do not lead directly to a strong and close social 
relationship or preferential buyer benefits. Rather, a buyer’s SD investments 
create supplier trust and commitment (relational capital) and a shared sense of 
the future (cognitive capital). Then, these forms of capital encourage the for-
mation of a strong and close social relationship. Preferences are granted only 
to buyers in such strong and close social relationships (structural capital). Thus, 
building relational and cognitive capital through SD investments are means to 
form structural capital, which prompts the supplier to grant preferential bene-
fits to the buyer.  
In a sense, cognitive capital may act as a safeguard of prior buyer invest-
ments (Joshi and Stump, 1999). Cognitive capital comprises shared goals and 
plans in not only the purchasing department but also engineering, quality, pro-
duction, and accounting. The joint effort of multiple departments encourages 
the creation of a close social relationship. Thus, managers should realize that 
the welfare of the buyer–supplier relationship depends on joint efforts by mul-
tiple departments in the company, not just one purchasing officer or key ac-
count manager.  
Structural capital offers several important benefits. It helps buyers access 
scarce and valuable resources, which entail not only unique buyer treatments 
but also unique insider information and privileged participation in events, such 
as internal managerial meetings. These preferential buyer benefits are espe-
cially important when firms try to capture resources in highly competitive mar-  42 
kets and when the supplier does not value the (small) buyer as a trading part-
ner (Ramsay and Wagner, 2009). For the welfare of their companies, managers 
need to recognize this process of social relationship formation and accessing 
preference. Especially since a buyer–supplier relationship built on social capital 
persists stronger and longer than a relationship based on power (Min et al., 
2008).  
Nevertheless, it is not only the buyer that benefits from investing in sup-
plier development. A supplier can generate benefits from granting preferential 
buyer benefits, including increased economic performance and sales. Supplier 
economic performance includes benefits external to the relationship, such as 
profitability and attracting other customers. Therefore, managers must focus 
not just on investing in SD but also take into account the role of relational and 
cognitive capital in the formation of structural capital when making relationship 
management decisions.  
2.8  Limitations and Further Research 
Our findings should be considered with the acknowledgement of several limita-
tions. First, the buyer practices SD programs, and we use only one buying com-
pany as a reference point for all suppliers, to gain insight into how different 
suppliers evaluate the same buyer. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize from 
this single case. However, other methods could also investigate preferential 
benefits and provide valuable insights. Further research might consider from 
diverse angles why suppliers prefer certain buyers. For example, we did not 
investigate the role of managers or company policy in the preferential treat-
ment decision process.  
Second, our examination of structural capital in the buyer–supplier rela-
tionship focused specifically on tie strength and a supply-side perspective. We 
did not investigate the role of structural capital with parties external to the 
relationship or from a dyadic perspective. Third parties, such as governments, 
competitors, customers, and other stakeholders, could have significant impacts 
in triads and networks. Research applying a multidomain approach thus might 
provide valuable insights into the influences of external relationship forces on 43 
structural capital and preferential treatment between the buyer and the sup-
plier.  
Third, we cannot test the causality of the relationships because we used 
cross-sectional data; the collection and analysis of longitudinal data should be a 
goal of further research. Case studies also might provide richer data in diverse 
preferential resource allocation and structural capital evolution contexts 
(Lawson et al., 2008). 
Another interesting evolution for structural capital research is the role of 
communication and information sharing factors. We look forward to research 
that investigates how interpersonal and impersonal communication channels 
influence the development of structural capital and collaboration.  
Other research should determine the phenomena that might diminish 
structural capital and therefore produce negative effects on relationships and 
business operations (for more see Jap and Ganesan, 2000). If the strong facets 
of a relationship (e.g., trustworthiness) become instead its weakest link, prob-
lems emerge. Furthermore, building on the assumption of voluntariness em-
bedded in social theory would have significant research implications. It would 
be interesting to determine how structural capital evolves in supply chains, 
networks, and diverse market conditions, such as protected markets, monopo-
listic industries (e.g., energy sectors in Gu et al., 2008), or markets under high 
uncertainty (e.g., high-tech).  
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2.9 Appendix  2 
MEASUREMENTS INSTRUMENTS CHAPTER 2 
Psychometric Properties for Null Model for First-Order Constructs 
Construct Item 
Loading 
(α)  CR AVE 
Cognitive Capital (Mohr and Spekman, 1994)    0.94 0.74 
 
The following Buyer X departments (engineering, production, 
quality, purchasing and accounting) ask us for our advice.   0.9    
 
The following Buyer X departments (engineering, production, 
quality, purchasing and accounting) ask us to participate in goal 
setting.   0.897     
 
The following Buyer X departments (engineering, production, 
quality, purchasing and accounting) ask us to participate in planning 
activities.   0.868     
 
The following Buyer X departments (engineering, production, 
quality, purchasing and accounting) encourage us to come with 
suggestions for improvements.   0.895     
 
The following Buyer X departments (engineering, production, 
quality, purchasing and accounting) ask us to participate in forecast-
ing activities.   0.748     
 
The following Buyer X departments (engineering, production, 
quality, purchasing and accounting) are collaborative.   0.837    
        
Relational Capital    0.92 0.51 
Trust (Kaufman et al., 2006)      
  We can count on Buyer X to follow through on their promises.  0.806  0.87 0.63 
 
When making decisions, Buyer X considers our business interest as 
well as its own.  0.751     
  We trust that Buyer X keeps our best interest in mind.  0.817     
  Buyer X is honest with us.  0.802     
        
Commitment (Kumar et al., 1994)      
 
It is pleasant working with Buyer X that is why we continue the 
relationship. 0.824  0.84 0.64 
  We want to remain a supplier to Buyer X.  0.835     
 
Our decision to remain a supplier for Buyer X is based on our attrac-
tion to the things that Buyer X represents as a company (e.g., 
image, brand, reference).  0.740    
        
Structural Capital (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001)    0.77 0.53 
 
Our employees share close social relations with the employees 
from Buyer X.  0.762    45 
  We feel indebted to Buyer X for what they have done for us.  0.688     
  We expect that we will be working with Buyer X far into the future. 0.725     
        
Supplier Development     0.94 0.57 
(Wagner 2006a, 2006b; Krause et al., 2007; Sanchez-Rodriguez et al., 2005)       
Evaluation     0.90 0.68 
  Buyer X sets clear improvement targets.  0.898     
 
Buyer X uses a formal procedure to evaluate our performance (e.g. 
audits, quality and/ or delivery measurement).  0.893    
  We are recognized by Buyer X for the improvements we realize.  0.862     
  We have been certified to work with Buyer X.  0.626     
Operational      0.91 0.68 
  Buyer X visits our site to assess our processes.  0.725    
  Buyer X standardizes product specifications together with us.  0.801     
 
Buyer X collaborates with us to improve our manufacturing proc-
esses. 0.891     
  Buyer X gives us technological advice (e.g. on materials, software).  0.859     
 
Buyer X gives us quality related advice (e.g., on the use of inspec-
tion equipment, quality assurance procedures).  0.828     
Strategic      0.88 0.70 
  We receive training from Buyer X.  0.799     
 
We are early involved in the new product development process of 
Buyer X.  0.839     
 
Buyer X gives us product development advice (e.g., on processes, 
project management).  0.877     
        
Preferential Buyer Benefits (Palmatier et al., 2007)       
  Comparing to OTHER BUYERS:       
  Buyer X receives special treatment from us.  0.693  0.84 0.63 
 
Buyer X receives invitations to special internal events (internal 
managerial meetings, engineering day, customer day) organized by 
our company  0.808    
  Buyer X receives special information from us.  0.871    
       
Supplier Economic Performance (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000)            0.84 0.63 
 
The relationship with Buyer X has provided our firm with a profit-
able market position.  0.784     
 
Through the relationship with Buyer X we were able to attract other 
customers. 0.823     
 
The supplier improvement programs of Buyer X help us to perform 
better.  0.779    
Notes: α = coefficient alpha, CR = composite reliability, AVE = average variance extracted       
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CHAPTER 3 
It Takes Two to Tango: A Dyadic View on 
Customization and Its Outcomes 
This paper aims to expand existing models of customization by integrating net-
work and social capital theories and investigating the roles of a close social 
relationship and information sharing in customization behavior of buyers and 
suppliers. In contrast with other customization studies by inspection of a con-
ceptual model with data from both, buyers and suppliers, this research repre-
sents a dyadic study that includes interactions between 103 buyer and supplier 
matched pairs, providing deeper insights into dyadic dependencies among con-
structs. Close social relationships prove to be important antecedents to supplier 
and buyer information sharing and buyer customization. However, we also find 
that suppliers attach more value to information shared by their partners than 
do buyers. Additionally, satisfaction with feedback is an important factor that 
stimulates buyer and supplier affective commitment to a relationship.  
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3.1 Introduction 
It is the dynamism of the environment that creates opportunities and poses 
threats to a company. A typical supply chain represents a network of buyer-
supplier relationships that may connect multiple industries. As a result, supply 
chain management requires managers to consider a number of inter-related 
factors, at different levels and dimensions, to not only identify but also deal 
with threats and opportunities. To increase the chances of survival, managers 
encounter a constant need to learn and customize their company to the turbu-
lent and ever-changing environment (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). Lack of 
customization will make an efficient company ineffective (Lee, 2004) and strain 
the development of the buyer-supplier relationship (Hagberg - Andersson, 
2006). Customization refers to tailored resource investments that meet particu-
lar needs exclusive to one party, especially tailored structural adaptations in a 
manufacturing process of a firm, and includes preferential and/or special 
treatment (Gwinner et al., 1998) and may comprise organizational and behav-
ioral adaptations (Schmidt, Tyler and Brennan, 2007). Customization can take 
the form of adaptations in human resources, products, manufacturing proc-
esses and logistics (Hagberg - Andersson, 2006; Hallen et al., 1991). Some spe-
cific examples of customization can be acquiring an additional assembly line 
and manufacturing machines to produce special components for one buying 
company or giving priority to a particular buyer under conditions of limited 
manufacturing capability (Schmidt et al., 2007).  
Following the possible customizations, managers believe that customiza-
tion can help them improve performance and effectiveness (Lee, 2004). Yet, 
managers rely on rich, detailed information and insights of those who are close 
to them (Kraatz, 1998; Rogers, 1995). As a consequence, close social relation-
ships have a positive impact on resource commitments e.g., in customization 
(Burt, 2005; Mukherji and Francis, 2008). Regardless of managerial efforts fo-
cused on profitability and competitive advantage, managers tend to neglect 
innovative ideas and information about environmental changes that come from 
those with whom they do not share such close social relationships.  49 
In this study we integrate two separate streams of literature. First, studies 
on adaptation have so far contributed by exploring the nature, antecedents 
and consequences of organizational adaptation and its types (Brennan et al., 
2003; Hallen et al., 1991; Mukherji and Francis, 2008; Rogers et al., 2007). Yet, 
these studies have not integrated their views with that of customization, as a 
relational benefit, that includes preferential or special treatment (Gwinner et 
al., 1998). Additionally, the phenomenon of preferential or special treatment 
attracted relatively little attention in supply chain studies on exchange relation-
ships (Håkansson, 1982) compared to extensive investigations in service set-
tings (e.g., Colgate and Land, 2001; Lacey et al., 2007).  
Nevertheless, since customization is perceived as an effective means of 
maintenance and/or development of a valued relationship (Brennan et al., 
2003) we seek to enhance existing knowledge on this phenomena from a dy-
adic perspective and make following additional  contributions to the literature. 
First, from a theoretical perspective, we aim to extend existing models of cus-
tomization. By integrating insights coming from network and social capital 
theories into one conceptual model we investigate the roles of a close social 
relationship and cross-functional information sharing in customization behavior 
of buyers and suppliers. Second, to our knowledge, neither social capital nor 
network theory perspectives have ever received attention in studies on cus-
tomization in a buyer-supplier relationship. Third, so far, studies have assumed 
similar behavior of buyers and suppliers who would be thinking and acting alike 
and in result, treated them alike (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Only very recently 
have indications been made that “alike thinking and acting” might not hold for 
both, buyers and suppliers, as their wants and needs might differ (Ross et al., 
2009). This calls for inspection of models with data from both, buyers and sup-
pliers. Thus, to fill in this theoretical and methodological gap, and in contrast to 
existing papers that study supplier and buyer customization only from a pur-
chasing perspective (e.g., Cannon and Perreault Jr., 1999; Mukherji and Francis, 
2008) we gather data from both sides of a buyer-supplier relationship. 
This paper is structured as follows. We begin with a conceptual framework 
where we briefly discuss the literature review and develop our hypotheses (see 
Fig. 1). Then we describe our methodological approach, present and discuss the   50 
results. Finally, we provide managerial implications and recommendations for 
future research as well as limitations of the study. 
3.2 Conceptual  Framework 
In this paper we integrate insights from network and social capital theories into 
one conceptual model (see Figure 3.1) to broaden an understanding of the 
roles of close social relationships between employees of a buyer and a supplier 
and their cross-functional information sharing in customization behavior and its 
outcomes. Therefore, below we briefly review the literature on three main 
constructs in this study, i.e., customization, close social relationships and in-
formation sharing.  
The best supply chains are characterized by being agile and adaptable (Lee, 
2004). Customization plays an important role in responding to the constant 
environmental changes that a supply chain’ members are confronted with 
(Hallen et al., 1991). Customization is also perceived as an effective means for 
maintaining and/or developing effective buyer-supplier relationships. Accord-
ing to (Brennan et al., 2003), at least one of the parties in every buyer-supplier 
relationship customizes to comfort the specific needs of the other. Customiza-
tion refers to an adaptation in the exchanged product or the process of ex-
change itself (Håkansson, 1982; Sweeney and Webb, 2002). Most researchers 
define adaptation as a process in which firms adjust their standard business 
practices exclusively for the other party in the relationship (Cannon and Hom-
burg, 2001; Cannon and Perreault Jr., 1999) in a response to the needs of the 
other party or discovered opportunities (Hagberg - Andersson, 2006). It can 
imply relational investments in specific assets (Brennan et al., 2003), and can 
occur, for example, as an alteration of a product, manufacturing process, in-
formation exchange and organizational restructuring (Brennan et al., 2003; 
Cannon and Homburg, 2001; Hallen, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed, 1993). 
One of the most cited studies on adaptation is the one by Hallen et al. (1991). 
Later in the 1990s, at the same time when Kraatz (1998) discussed adaptation 
as the result of the intercourse of close relationships and information sharing, 
Gwinner et al. (1998) introduced a concept of relational benefits comprising 
three categories, one of which was customization. In their customization con-51 
struct, Gwinner et al. (1998) went beyond adaptation as structural modifica-
tions in a manufacturing process of a firm and included as well preferential 
and/or special treatment benefits in the construct. Because in this paper we 
integrate two separate streams of literature on adaptation and customization 
as a relational benefit, we build on the definition provided by Gwinner et al. 
(1998) and Sweeney and Webb (2002) that customization refers to adaptive 
behavior in the form of investments like tailored benefits that meet particular 
needs exclusive to one party, especially tailored structural adaptations in a 
manufacturing process of a firm, and includes special and/or preferential 
treatment. Kraatz (1998) pointed to the roles of close relationships and infor-
mation sharing in customization. To fully understand the role of close social 
relationships in customization we build on social capital theory. Social capital 
theory has so far attracted a number of scholars to study socially related phe-
nomena (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Tsai, 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) also in supply 
chain management (e.g., Krause et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2008; Min et al., 
2008). Studies on social capital originate from network theory and Granovet-
ter’s (1985) study of social embeddedness in economic exchange. Benefits that 
social capital may bring are widely recognized among academia regardless of 
various conceptualizations and operationalizations of the construct (e.g., in 
Adler and Kwon, 2002; Krause et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2008). Even though 
social capital offers access to preferential benefits, Granovetter (1992) points 
to the exclusive role of social relationships within social capital. A social rela-
tionship between actors is a phenomena from social network (Seibert et al., 
2001). In this paper we focus on a close social relationship based on studies in 
network closure theory that claim that a close social relationship is more bene-
ficial than a distant one (Ahuja, 2000; Cohen, 1988). A close social relationship 
encompasses a higher level of closeness, reciprocity and indebtedness com-
pared to a ‘distant’ relationship (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Rindfleisch and 
Moorman, 2001). Dense, close social relationships tend to be more beneficial 
than loose ones (Ahuja, 2000; Cohen, 1988; Lin et al., 2001; Uzzi, 1997) by of-
fering access to sensitive information (e.g., Granovetter, 1973), privileged in-
formation and/or even privileged economic resources such as subsidized loans 
or protected markets (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998). Thus, in this paper we 
adopt the view that privileged access to customized resources results from a 
close social relationship (Cook and Emerson, 1978).   52 
Furthermore, studies on network theory associate close social relation-
ships with specific, relevant and fine-tuned information (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 
1997) that is of high quality (Rowley et al., 2000). In general information shar-
ing refers to the extent that a party in a relationship reveals information that 
may affect the other party’s operations (Heide and Miner, 1992). According to 
Kraatz (1998) managers evaluate information coming from their close network 
differently than that from sparse connections. Information received from a 
close social relationship meets all their conditions to be trusted while informa-
tion coming from a weak social relationship often seems not specific or rele-
vant enough and as a consequence it will not be trusted. Frazier and Huddle-
ston (2009) suggest a close relationship promotes customization by increasing 
information sharing. Because information from close social relationships em-
bodies details that give it meaning and usefulness (Uzzi, 1997), managers see it 
as more applicable to their operations and solving problems they face (McEvily 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
Automotive manufacturers like Toyota and Honda pioneered not only in cutting 
their supplier bases but most importantly with building close relationships with 
their suppliers, close collaborative partnerships (Liker and Choi, 2004). Close 
relationships among supply chain parties represent a business strategy that can 
be used to increase benefits (Anderson and Jap, 2005). As a consequence, a lot 
of formal and informal exchange of meaningful information takes place in close 
relationships (Mohr and Nevin, 1990). Even though majority of studies in sup-
ply chain focus on close buyer-supplier partnerships, we consider the impor-
tance of close social relationships among employees of a buyer and a supplier, 
which have been so far neglected (Wu, Steward and Hartley, 2010), by integrat-
ing insights from social capital and network theories. Additionally, because of 
our dyadic approach, we distinguish buyer and supplier information sharing. 
Buyer information sharing refers to the information sharing behavior of a buyer 
towards a supplier and supplier information sharing refers to information shar-
ing behavior of a supplier towards a buyer. Because a close social relationship is 
associated with closeness, reciprocity and indebtedness (Rindfleisch and 
Moorman, 2001), it encourages the exchange of rich, sensitive and far more 
frequent and detailed information than distant weak relationships (Kraatz, 
1998; McEvily and Marcus, 2005; Uzzi, 1999). Prior studies found that more 
information is shared with those with whom a close social relationship is estab-
lished (Friedkin, 1982; Jack, 2005; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Zaccaro 
and Lowe, 1988). This could imply that a supplier would be sharing more in-
formation with a buyer who developed a close relationship with the supplier (a 
buyer close social relationship). On the other side of the dyad, a buyer would 
be sharing more information with a supplier who developed a close social rela-
tionship with the buyer (a supplier close social relationship). Thus, we suggest:  
 
H1a:  A buyer close social relationship has a positive impact on supplier infor-
mation sharing.  
H1b:  A supplier close social relationship has a positive impact on buyer infor-
mation sharing. 
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In this paper an extended definition of customization entails not only tailored 
benefits but also special and/or preferential treatment. A company can in-
crease the chances to get preferential treatment with the use of communica-
tion behavior (Hald, Cordon and Vollman, 2009). A fundamental element of 
communication behavior that we are focusing on in this paper is information 
sharing (Mohr et al., 1996; Mohr and Spekman, 1994). As mentioned above we 
focus on both, buyer and supplier information sharing. Information sharing 
contributes to making parties of a buyer-supplier relationship aware of the 
specific needs and wants of a buyer/supplier , and thus, presents an opportu-
nity for customization (McEvily and Marcus, 2005). In this paper we examine 
both, buyer and supplier customization. Buyer customization refers to the 
buyer’s adaptive behavior in the form of tailored resource investments that 
meet particular needs exclusive to one supplier (e.g. tailored structural adapta-
tions in a manufacturing process of a firm, and includes special and/or prefer-
ential treatment). Supplier customization refers to supplier adaptive behavior 
in the form of tailored resource investments that meet particular needs exclu-
sive to a buyer and includes special and/or preferential treatment. Before buy-
ers and suppliers decide to invest in relationship-specific customization, they 
need to have access to information about the needs and wants of the other 
party (Nesheim, 2001), therefore, we suggest: 
 
H2a: Supplier information sharing has a positive impact on buyer customization. 
H2b: Buyer information sharing has a positive impact on supplier customization. 
 
Apart from information sharing, another strategy a company can use to get 
their supplier or buyer to customize, is to strengthen the social relationships 
between the employees of the two companies (Ellegard, 2006; Jap, 1999). A 
close social relationship is characterized by closeness, reciprocity and indebt-
edness (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Because employees of both a buyer 
and a supplier share close social relations with each other, the likelihood that 
they exchange privileged information or enable privileged access to resources 
such as subsidized loans, exclusive access to protected markets is very high 
(Coleman, 1988; Cook and Emerson, 1978; Portes, 1998). Jack (2005) shows 
that close social relationships are not only fundamental for company activity 
but also instrumental for maintenance, extension and expansion of the busi-  56 
ness. The existence of close social relationships makes the relationship parties’ 
actions significant and influential for each other (Kraatz, 1998). Having a close 
social relationship means that both buyers and suppliers are indebted to one 
another for what they have done for each other so far and are expecting to 
continue the relationship (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Indebtedness and 
continuance expectation should enhance the fulfillment of the other party’s 
need for customization because a close social relationship governs behaviors in 
a relationship (Rowley et al., 2000, p. 371). Therefore, we suggest: 
 
H3a:  A buyer close social relationship has a positive impact on buyer customi-
zation. 
H3b:  A supplier close social relationship has a positive impact on supplier cus-
tomization. 
 
In a buyer-supplier relationship, supplier manufacturing performance refers to 
the buyer’s evaluation of satisfaction with the supplier’s record in terms of 
meeting the buyer’s expectations of supplier performance. These expectations 
are measured with the use of a range of performance metrics (Cannon and 
Perreault Jr., 1999). In other words, a buyer evaluates a supplier on a number 
of manufacturing expectations and informs the supplier about the evaluation 
results that represent its satisfaction with the supplier’s performance, via feed-
back. Feedback may as well include a range of manufacturing performance 
metrics (Kim, 1984). However, satisfaction with feedback was found to be a 
more significant indicator of reactions to performance evaluation feedback 
(Giles and Mossholder, 1990) than feedback’s utility or accuracy (Keeping and 
Levy, 2000). Satisfaction with feedback entails not only the acceptance of per-
formance metrics ratings but also the feedback itself (Jawahar, 2006). There-
fore, in our study we refer to supplier satisfaction with feedback as to a sup-
plier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on not only cost reductions, 
quality and delivery improvement (e.g., Fynes, Voss and de Burca, 2005; Möller 
and Törrönen, 2003) but also improvements in new product and new process 
development. Buyer satisfaction with feedback refers to a buyer’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a supplier about a supplier’s ability to meet various buyer 
requirements with regards to supplier performance in the areas like cost reduc-
tions, quality, delivery and new product and new process development. Based 57 
on earlier studies that found customization to have a significant role in per-
formance improvement (Hagberg - Andersson, 2006; Mukherji and Francis, 
2008; Rogers et al., 2007) we hypothesize: 
 
H4a:  Buyer customization has a positive impact on a buyer’s satisfaction with 
feedback from a supplier about its ability to meet buyer requirements. 
H4b:  Buyer customization has a positive impact on a supplier’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance. 
H4c:  Supplier customization has a positive impact on a buyer’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a supplier about its ability to meet buyer require-
ments. 
H4d:  Supplier customization has a positive impact on a supplier’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance. 
 
Improvement is continuous if a supplier shows an upward trend in meeting the 
performance metrics over time (Cannon and Perreault Jr., 1999; Fynes et al., 
2005). Buyers often impose strict improvement requirements on their suppliers 
(e.g., Toyota and Honda). Suppliers know that they have to improve continu-
ously in order to survive and gain benefits. However, this manufacturing per-
formance improvement is driven by supplier knowledge about what buyer 
desires (Joshi, 2009).This operations-related real-time demand information is 
fundamental for supply chain activities like forecasting, planning and execution 
(Wang and Wei, 2007). Sharing of operations-related information such as on 
forecasting or planning increases information balance in a relationship and 
thus, decreases potential opportunistic behavior (Dyer, 1997). More visibility in 
operations of relationship parties helps managers in their decision-making 
process, as well as enhances performance in a supply chain (Mabert and 
Venkataramanan, 1998). Prior studies found that information sharing among 
various functional departments in a buyer-supplier relationship enhances 
manufacturing performance more than if information occurs only between 
purchasing and sales functions (Carter and Miller, 1989). This has implications 
for our study and the measure of satisfaction with feedback on performance. If 
not only a purchasing officer but also various departments and/or functions of 
a buyer share information with a supplier (buyer information sharing), they 
enhance the supplier’s satisfaction with feedback on performance, because   58 
then the supplier has more visibility in processes as well as more understanding 
of operations of the buyer. On the other side of the dyad, if a supplier shares 
information with a buyer (supplier information sharing), the supplier makes the 
buyer more satisfied with the supplier’s abilities to meet the buyer’s perform-
ance requirements, because then the buyer is more aware of supplier proc-
esses and operations. This implies that the better buyer and supplier compa-
nies understand the specific supplier/buyer context (operationally, strategi-
cally, etc) the better they understand the performance feedback. Hence, we 
suggest: 
 
H5a:  Supplier information sharing has a positive impact on a buyer’s satisfac-
tion with feedback from a supplier about its ability to meet buyer re-
quirements. 
H5b:  Buyer information sharing has a positive impact on a supplier’s satisfac-
tion with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance. 
 
When a buyer’s performance expectations are met, the relationship becomes 
valuable and turns into an asset that helps the company achieve its objectives 
(Cambra-Fierro and Polo-Redondo, 2008). This is because the evaluation of 
supplier manufacturing performance by a buyer serves as a verification of real 
capabilities of a supplier, which in turn helps the buyer and supplier attach 
value to the relationship benefits (Rao, Philips and Johnson, 2006). Satisfaction 
with feedback entails not only the acceptance of performance metrics ratings 
but also the feedback itself (Jawahar, 2006). Additionally, satisfaction with 
feedback signifies appreciation of the supplier’s contribution to the relationship 
with the buyer and the buying company. This appreciation implies better possi-
bilities for future cooperation. Furthermore satisfaction with feedback en-
hances not only appreciation of the contribution but also an emotional attach-
ment between buyers and suppliers (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch and To-
polynytsky, 2002). Therefore, we expect that satisfaction with feedback has a 
positive impact on affective commitment. Commitment plays a critical role in 
buyer–supplier relationships because it reflects the desire to continue a rela-
tionship (Moorman et al., 1993). Buyers and suppliers stay in a relationship 
because they like it, are satisfied with it and identify with it (Kumar et al., 
1994). Affective commitment stands for a cognitive-based attachment to the 59 
other partner (Geyskens et al., 1996). Commitment can be regarded as the next 
phase of relationship development after the phase of expansion which refers to 
benefits such as customization (Fynes et al., 2005). This commitment phase 
implies a strong promise to continue the relationship resulting from the appre-
ciation of relationship benefits and its feedback on this matter. Thus:  
 
H6a:  A buyer’s satisfaction with feedback from a supplier about its ability to 
meet buyer requirements has a positive impact on buyer affective com-
mitment. 
H6b:  A buyer’s satisfaction with feedback from a supplier about its ability to 
meet buyer requirements has a positive impact on supplier affective 
commitment. 
H6c:  A supplier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on supplier perform-
ance has a positive impact on buyer affective commitment. 
H6d:  A supplier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on supplier perform-
ance has a positive impact on supplier affective commitment. 
3.4 Methodology 
Prior studies emphasize the need for dyadic research designs to investigate 
buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Anderson, Håkansson and Johanson, 1994; 
Chen and Paulraj, 2004b). However, difficulties in collecting dyadic data often 
result in studies with monadic data. Furthermore, difficulties associated with 
dyadic research design and analysis often led to the use of the reciprocal part 
of the data only for the sake of measurement quality check (e.g., Heide and 
Stump, 1995; Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003). Others approached these 
dilemma of research design and analysis by conducting separate analysis of 
buyer-side and supplier-side data (e.g., Jap, 1999; Rokkan et al., 2003). Yet, 
some constructed measurement scales from two indicators, one representing 
an average of buyer data and the other representing an average of the supplier 
data (e.g., Selnes and Sallis, 2003). These approaches were not consistent with 
rules and requirements for dyadic data analysis applied in social science and 
psychology studies (Kenny, Kashy and Cook, 2006).    60 
3.4.1 Study  Context 
To examine our conceptual model we set our research in the context of a sec-
ond level of a vertical supply chain (Hagberg - Andersson, 2006; Wathne and 
Heide, 2004). Specifically, we study the relationships between the buyer (a 
large buying manufacturing company) and its most important product-related 
suppliers on one side of the dyad. On the other side of the dyad we take the 
reciprocal part of the dyadic viewpoint that consists of matched purchasing 
officers’ evaluations of the relationship their buying company has with these 
suppliers. This results in a dyadic set up of our conceptual model, research 
design and data analysis. As described in chapter 1 to test our hypotheses in 
this study, we rely on a database of 103 data points of matched pairs of pur-
chasing officers from a buying company and key account managers from sup-
plying companies. 
3.4.2  Dyadic Research Setting 
Even though our conceptual model builds on network theory we use an online 
survey to collect data and structural equation modeling to conduct dyadic 
analysis on dyadic reciprocal data. In the reciprocal design data is collected 
from both, the focal party and its partners (Kenny et al., 2006). Using question-
naires to gather data based conceptually on network theory is not new 
(Friedkin, 1980; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Wathne 
and Heide, 2004). It is also quite common to regard a dyad as a network phe-
nomenon (Borgatti et al., 2009). Studies on social network analysis (SNA) report 
three fundamental units of analysis, dyadic (tie-level), monadic (actor-level), 
and network (group-level; Hatala, 2006). SNA papers refer to dyadic data as 
one data point for every dyad, that is a pair of actors (e.g., Hatala, 2006). 
Therefore, extant literature that investigates dyads, based on network theory, 
has to a great extent disregarded the issue of duality of dyadic data (Medlin, 
2003). Treating measurement as if only one side of the relationship caused it 
(Kenny et al., 2006). On the contrary, both parties of a buyer-supplier relation-
ship make up the dyadic measurement, even though those contributions can 
be reflected as different functions (Bond and Kenny, 2002). For instance, the 
trust of Supplier X in Buyer X is caused partially by how Buyer X acts, as well as 61 
by the unique relationship that Supplier X and Buyer X have created (Kenny et 
al., 2006). Even though as Kenny et al. (2006) suggest many factors contributed 
to a dominance of individualistic studies over a higher level studies, dyadic 
studies can explain far more complex and interrelated phenomenon. The au-
thors claim that many constructs have intrinsically dyadic nature that means 
that they are related to other constructs in the study. Mizruchi and Marquis 
(2006) found that dyadic data and analysis are especially appropriate when a 
dependent variable is quantitative and/or involves measures of behavior, be-
cause dyadic data perform better than network data when studying similarities 
in behavior. Therefore, attributes of dyadic data make dyadic studies poten-
tially more interesting in terms of prospective theoretical and empirical contri-
butions.  
3.4.3  Dyadic Research Design 
This study has a reciprocal dyadic research design, because the data is collected 
from both, the focal party (the buying company) and its partners (suppliers). 
Such reciprocal dyadic designs have several characteristics that distinguish 
them from monadic data, namely nonindependence and distinguishability 
(Kenny et al., 2006).  Since dyadic data comes from members of the same rela-
tionship, the measures are allowed to violate the condition of independence. In 
other words, buyer scores can be related to supplier scores, and a dyad score 
can be related to scores of other dyads, because they would come from the 
same supply chain or the same network.  As suggested by Kenny et al. (2006) 
we used canonical correlation analysis as a multivariate test for independence. 
Within the PLS path modeling framework canonical correlation analysis can be 
emulated setting up two latent variables, one for the buyers and one for the 
suppliers, with a formative measurement model containing the relevant vari-
ables and using a centroid scheme (cf. Guinot, Latreille and Tenenhaus, 2001). 
Our analysis revealed that the hypothesis of nonindependence could be re-
jected using a bootstrapping approach with 1000 resamples (r=0.80, p<0.001). 
Dyadic members are considered distinguishable if there is a meaningful factor 
that can be used ordering them. In our case, the dyads are clearly distinguish-
able as buyers and suppliers perform different roles in the relationship (cf. 
Kenny et al., 2006).   62 
3.4.4 Measurement  Instruments 
The measure for close relationship included items introduced by Rindfleisch 
and Moorman (2001) where a close social relationship characterizes with 
closeness, reciprocity and indebtedness. The items were measured on a seven-
point Likert-type scale of agreement ranging from 1 = “completely disagree” to 
7 = “completely agree”. Appendix 3 provides an overview of the measures used 
in this study.  
The information sharing measure was adapted from Mohr and Spekman 
(1994). The items were measured with a seven-point Likert-type scales ranging 
from 1 = “never” to 7 = “always”. In this paper information sharing comprises 
operational information that refers to changing needs, events and other rele-
vant changes that may affect the other party in the relationship, and thus the 
relationship itself. Buyer information sharing was evaluated by suppliers as 
coming from five departments of the buying company, i.e., purchasing, produc-
tion, engineering, quality and accounting. We assessed scores for each indica-
tor for five departments, and then calculated a mean score for the analysis. 
Supplier information sharing was evaluated by purchasing officers as coming 
from a buying company in general, the scale did not involve evaluation of in-
formation sharing coming from various departments.   
The buyer and supplier customization scales were based on Palmatier et 
al. (2007) and their items were measured with a seven-point Likert-type scales 
ranging from 1 = “never” to 7 = “always”. To construct this scale we followed 
the definition of customization provided by Gwinner et al. (1998) that customi-
zation not only refers to tailored benefits that meet particular needs exclusive 
to one party, but also includes special or preferential treatment.  
The exploratory phase of our data collection included semi-structured in-
terviews which served as the basis for the development of a five-item scale of 
manufacturing performance including feedback. Feedback not only serves as a 
motivational technique, but the content of feedback may include manufactur-
ing performance metrics (Kim, 1984). Thus, in our study, we collected data on 
supplier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on not only cost reductions, 
quality and delivery terms but also improvements in new product and new 
process development. Suppliers evaluated their satisfaction with feedback that 
they receive from five departments of the buying company, i.e., purchasing, 63 
production, engineering, quality and accounting. We assessed scores for each 
indicator for five departments (engineering, production, quality, purchasing 
and accounting), and then calculated a mean score for the analysis. Yet, on the 
other side of the dyad, we collected data from purchasing officers on a buyer’s 
satisfaction with feedback from a supplier about a supplier’s ability to meet 
various buyer requirements like cost reductions, quality, delivery and new 
product and new process development. This scale did not involve various de-
partments. The items were measured with a seven-point Likert-type scales 
ranging from 1 = “never” to 7 = “always”. 
Affective commitment scale comprised three items, measured on a seven-
point Likert-type scale of agreement ranging from 1 = “completely disagree” to 
7 = “completely agree”, investigated by Kumar et al. (1994).  Affective com-
mitment refers to a one party’s cognitive-based attachment to the other party 
(Geyskens et al., 1996). 
For the control variables, we measured the power of the buyer and the 
power of the supplier with a three-item construct we adapted from Mohr et al. 
(1996). Relationship length comprised a measure provided by Jap and Ganesan 
(2000). We adapted a measure of the supplier’s dependence and the buyer’s 
dependence from scales used by Kumar et al. (1994).  
3.5 Findings 
3.5.1 Analysis  approach 
Due to the fact that we have distinguishable dyads in our data we can use PLS 
path modeling to test the hypothesis in our conceptual model (Kenny et al. 
2006). The PLS algorithm implemented in Smart PLS (Chin, 1998; Ringle, 2006b) 
uses (ordinary) least squares estimation to obtain the parameters estimates in 
the structural, or inner, model (Chin and Newsted, 1999; Tenenhaus et al., 
2005; Wold, 1988). A major assumption of OLS estimation is that the distur-
bance terms (Chin and Newsted, 1999) of the endogenous latent variables are 
uncorrelated. However, in structural equation models we need to correlate the 
disturbance terms of the endogenous latent variables (LVs) to allow for nonin-
dependence using dyadic data (Kenny et al., 2006). Therefore, we used seem-  64 
ingly unrelated regression (SUR; Zellner, 1962) to obtain the parameter esti-
mates in the structural, or inner, model. More in particular, we obtained the LV 
scores from Smart PLS and used STATA 10 (command sureg) to obtain seem-
ingly unrelated regression parameter estimates. To obtain the standard errors 
and test statistics we employed a bootstrapping procedure with 1000 resam-
ples. 
3.5.2 Psychomteric  Properties 
We used SmartPLS to assess the psychometric properties of the measurement 
instruments, such as reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity 
(Tenenhaus et al., 2005). The internal consistency and reliability of reflective 
constructs can be evaluated with composite reliability (CR) (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981; Wetzels et al., 2009), average variance extracted (AVE), and factor load-
ings (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Similar rules apply to assesments of con-
tent, convergent, and discriminant validity (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006). 
All CRs exceeded the cut-off value of .7, and the AVEs exceeded .5 except for 
supplier customization which was 0.46 (see Appendix 3). Convergent validity 
found support with every item’s standardized loading on its respective con-
struct greater than .5 (Hulland, 1999). Discriminant validity was satisfactory 
when constructs shared more variance with their own measures than with 
other constructs in the model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), so that the value of 
the square root of the AVE exceeded the construct’s intercorrelations (see 
Table 3.1). 
As we collected our data using a survey questionnaire, we sought to safe-
guard from common method variance (CMV) by applying Harman’s one-factor 
test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Specifically, the procedure requires entering 
all the items together into a factor analysis (principal components analysis 
[PCA] with an unrotated solution). We repeated this procedure for each side of 
the dyad, buyer and suppliers. In case that a single factor solution emerged or 
one general factor accounted for most of the variance, CMV would pose a 
threat (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In our study, we included 22 items from 
the buyer and 23 items from the suppliers. The first factor explained 33.25% of 
the variance for the buyer data and 37.37% of the variance for the supplier 65 
data. The unrotated solution did not reveal one general factor. Therefore, CMV 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5.3 Hypotheses  Testing 
We found support for ten of our sixteen hypotheses (Table 3.2). In line with our 
expectations, our empirical results support most of our hypotheses with a few 
exceptions. Supplier close relationship to a buyer does not influence a supplier 
to customize to a buyer (H3b). Contrary to our expectations, supplier informa-
tion sharing to a buyer has a negative effect on a buyer’s customization to a 
supplier (H2a). Further, buyer customization to a supplier does not directly 
influence positively a buyer’s satisfaction with feedback from a supplier about 
its ability to meet buyer requirements (H4a) or a supplier’s satisfaction with 
feedback from a buyer on supplier performance (H4b). Supplier customization, 
on the other hand has no effect on a supplier’s satisfaction with feedback from 
a buyer on supplier performance (H4d). Additionally, a supplier’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance has no effect on buyer 
affective commitment to a supplier (H6c).  
Of the control variables relationship length, buyer dependence and sup-
plier dependence have no effects either on buyer customization or supplier 
customization. Supplier power however, impacts buyer customization as well 
as buyer power influences supplier customization. 
To assess the fit of our data to the model in SmartPLS, we used the R² val-
ues of the endogenous constructs (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). According to Cohen 
(1988), values of R² of .02, .13, and .26 indicate small, medium and large effect 
sizes, respectively, of the treatment independent of sample sizes. The individ-
ual values for R² indicated that the model explained 15% of the variance in 
supplier information sharing, 26% of buyer information sharing, 26% of buyer 
customization, 10% of supplier customization, 49% of a buyer’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a supplier about its ability to meet buyer requirements, 
58% of a supplier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on supplier per-
formance, 37% of buyer affective commitment, 27% of supplier affective com-
mitment, (see Figure 3.2). As a global fit measure, we used a formula devel-
oped by Tenenhaus et al. (2005). Relative to the mostly medium-sized effects in 
our model, the evaluated fit of .46 indicated a good fit of the data to the model 
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3.6 Discussion 
The goal of this study has been to broaden existing knowledge on customiza-
tion from a dyadic perspective of both buyers and suppliers. Based on our re-
view of adaptation and relational benefits literature we developed an under-
standing of customization as a construct comprising not only resource com-
mitments in adjustment but also preferential treatment. In the context of a 
buyer-supplier relationship we have proposed to integrate insights from net-
work and social capital theories in one conceptual model to show the roles of 
close social relationships and information sharing in customization behavior of 
buyers and suppliers. Further, we investigated their influence on satisfaction 
with feedback on performance evaluations and performance requirements, 
resulting in relationship affective commitment. Our dyadic approach has been 
motivated by the fact that we found a number of studies that have dyadic data 
in supply chain (Jap, 1999; Perrone et al., 2003; Rokkan et al., 2003; Selnes and 
Sallis, 2003). However most of these studies either assumed the same behav-
iors of buyers and suppliers, who would be thinking and acting alike, and in 
result, treated them alike (Jap and Anderson, 2003) due to a lack of theoretical 
support for differences on either side of the dyad, or would run two separate 
analysis for buyers and for suppliers. Such procedure did not take into account 
insights on the actor-partner effects. That is the effects that buyer data have on 
supplier data and vice versa. Only very recently have indications been made the 
“alike thinking and acting” might not hold for both, buyers and suppliers, as 
their wants and needs might differ (Ross et al., 2009) similarly to their percep-
tions (Hald et al., 2009). Therefore, we designed a study in which both, buyers 
and suppliers data are analyzed together, thus, providing insights into interde-
pendencies among partners in the dyad. 
So far, most of extant literature studying the strength of a relationship as-
sociated a close social relationship with richer and far more detailed informa-
tion than a distant weak relationship (Kraatz, 1998; McEvily and Marcus, 2005; 
Uzzi, 1999). In line with our suggestions (H1a & H1b) and earlier studies (e.g., 
Friedkin, 1982) close social relationships encourage information sharing about 
activities in organizational settings. We also argued in our conceptual assump-
tions that a close relationship has a positive impact on customization in case of 
both, buyers (H3a) and suppliers (H3b). Our results support this argument only 71 
on the side of the buyer. For suppliers a close relationship does not lead di-
rectly to customization in the presence of information sharing. Buyer informa-
tion sharing plays a significant role for suppliers before they customize (H2b). 
This could be an indication that suppliers are more careful than buyers when 
making their customization decision opposite to buyers for whom supplier 
information sharing has a negative effect on buyer customization (H2a). In 
conclusion, suppliers need rich, sensitive and detailed information that is useful 
and meaningful before they take any actions. As our results indicate, the im-
pact of information sharing on customization varies with being a buyer and a 
supplier. Nevertheless, Kenny et al. (2006, p. 149) provide further explanation 
of the pattern of the effects having similar magnitude but opposite signs as in a 
case of the influence of information sharing on customization. According to 
them, the phenomenon occurs when one party of the buyer-supplier relation-
ship is relationship oriented and the other is transactional oriented. The buyer’s 
orientation could further explain the supplier’s need for information in close 
relationships compared to buyers. Our results may indicate that a supplier that 
is relationship oriented has a positive association with information sharing. On 
the other hand, a buyer that is transactional oriented might feel less satisfied 
the more the supplier shares information.  
We have also argued that both buyer and supplier customization have 
positive impacts on both, supplier’s satisfaction with buyer’s feedback on sup-
plier manufacturing performance and buyer’s satisfaction with supplier’s feed-
back on the ability to meet manufacturing performance (as requested by the 
buyer). This argument holds only partially. Data from buyers provide evidence 
that buyer customization does not influence buyer satisfaction with feedback 
from a supplier about its ability to meet buyer requirements (H4a) or supplier 
satisfaction with the performance feedback from a buyer (H4b). On the other 
side of the dyad, data from suppliers prove that supplier customization has a 
positive impact on the buyer’s satisfaction with the feedback from the supplier 
about its ability to meet buyer requirements (H4c) and no effect on the sup-
plier’s satisfaction with performance feedback from a buyer (H4d). This implies 
that the buyer feels more satisfied with the supplier’s feedback about its ability 
to meet buyer requirements when the supplier has customized to the buyer. 
Yet, supplier customization has no effect on supplier satisfaction with perform-
ance feedback coming from the buyer.    72 
One possible explanation to this could be managerial propensity to base 
decisions on information available from close relationships because they trust 
it is more trustworthy and accurate (Kraatz, 1998; McEvily and Marcus, 2005; 
Rogers, 1995). Hence, their decisions concerning customization could be biased 
and their outcome would not be satisfaction with feedback on performance 
improvement. Lack of supplier satisfaction with feedback may also be an indi-
cation that a supplier had to reallocate resources from other relationships with 
other buyers to customize to the exclusive buyer (Anderson et al., 1994). 
One of our next arguments that were fully supported by our empirical re-
sults was a claimed positive impact of information sharing on customization 
(H5a & H5b). Therefore, information sharing confirms to play a significant role 
in buyer-supplier relationships by directly influencing the level of satisfaction 
with feedback on performance requirements and the ability to meet these 
requirements (Joshi, 2009; Krause et al., 2000). As our findings indicate, cross-
functional information sharing takes a significant place in accepting evaluation 
feedback in a buyer-supplier relationship. 
Furthermore, we have also suggested that a buyer’s satisfaction with 
feedback from a supplier and a supplier’s satisfaction with feedback from a 
buyer, both, have positive impacts on buyer and supplier affective commit-
ment. Our results support this argument fully for a buyer’s satisfaction with 
feedback from a supplier, but only partially for a supplier’s satisfaction with 
feedback from a buyer. When the supplier is satisfied with feedback from the 
buyer it increases the supplier’s affective commitment to the buyer and the will 
to further collaborate with that buyer (H6d) but it does not enhance directly 
the buyer’s affective commitment towards the supplier or the will to further 
collaborate with the supplier (H6c). However, when the buyer is satisfied with 
feedback from the supplier this relates positively to the buyer’s affective com-
mitment towards the supplier and the will to further collaborate with the sup-
plier (H6a) as well as the supplier’s affective commitment towards the buyer 
(H6b). The difference here could be due to the fact that the supplier reports its 
satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on its performance whereas the buyer 
has the information about the supplier’s ability to meet requirements, which is 
not the actual performance data. Therefore, future research could investigate 
the influence of objective performance data on affective commitment. 73 
3.7 Managerial  Implications 
The strength of the relations among dyadic constructs poses a number of at-
tractive research questions that are remarkably appealing to managers 
(Mizruchi and Marquis, 2006). Given the dyadic character of this study and the 
strength of the relations among the dyadic constructs, the results of our study 
have managerial implications for both buyers and suppliers. The major mana-
gerial implication that applies to both, buyers and suppliers, is the role of in-
formation sharing in the satisfaction with feedback on performance. If both 
buyers and suppliers share information with each other, this has a significant 
and positive effect on their acceptance of feedback on the evaluation of per-
formance requirement. Cross-functional information sharing among partner 
companies and satisfaction with feedback are thus important factors in buyer-
supplier relationships. Buyers should be aware that the quality of feedback that 
buyers give to suppliers about supplier performance and receive from suppliers 
about their ability to meet performance requirements both act as relationship 
glue. Giving and receiving proper feedback not only makes the buyer more 
attracted and committed to conduct business with the supplier in the long-run, 
but it also triggers the reciprocal effect from suppliers, and makes them com-
mitted to the relationship with the buyer. Feedback is an essential contributor 
to supplier satisfaction (Maunu, 2003) and in our study it proves to be a signifi-
cant tool for gluing the buyer-supplier relationship in terms of affective com-
mitment. Thus, satisfaction with feedback will make the relationship parties to 
collaborate with one another because of cognitive-based feelings of attach-
ment such as because they like each other. Also the more companies customize 
the more they can (and should) give specific feedback. Supplier feedback to 
buyers about their capabilities strongly impacts the affective commitment of 
buyers, marketing professionals of suppliers can (and should) use this knowl-
edge to improve their working relationships with buying companies. Implica-
tions of feedback specifically for buyers are that they should provide more 
feedback to those suppliers that they are seriously interested in working more 
closely with, and they can organize regular and formal feedback sessions to 
facilitate this.  
Further findings offer separate guidance for buyers and suppliers. In par-
ticular, results indicate that buyers, when they are really interested in stimulat-  74 
ing supplier customization, must stop acting in a transactional way and stop 
disregarding the information coming from suppliers. In the qualitative inter-
views that we conducted while developing our survey questionnaire, suppliers 
repeatedly reported that the buyers were not really willing to listen to them 
and that they suffer from a not invented here syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982). 
At the same time, our results clearly indicate that having a close social relation-
ship alone is not sufficient to drive suppliers to customization. It’s the quality 
and quantity of the information that is exchanged between buyer and supplier 
that is important. Suppliers need to know the wants and needs of the buyer 
before they can decide on where and how to customize.   
In the interviews suppliers indicated that they were ready to extend their 
collaboration with the buyer, however, the buyer was not yet so open for it. 
Suppliers wanted to be involved earlier in the buyer’s operational processes. 
They were eager to take part in innovation projects as well as in setting a 
shared strategy. However, suppliers experienced the buyer to act as an expert 
not only at its shop floor but also at the suppliers’.  In a model to build deeper 
relationships with suppliers, Liker and Choi (2004) indicate that buyers should 
learn about how their suppliers work by devoting time and effort in not only 
learning how the supplier works but also in respecting the supplier’s capabili-
ties. Suppliers are more open for collaboration with buyers at different levels, 
i.e., tactical, operational and strategic than buyers are. This supports our sug-
gestion that buyers need to enhance their pro-relationship behavior in terms of 
listening to the voice of suppliers and develop better strategies for managing 
buyer-supplier relationships.    
Another insight that buyers might find interesting is that their customiza-
tion to suppliers does not seem to have a direct impact on either supplier satis-
faction with feedback from a buyer or buyer satisfaction with feedback from a 
supplier, as regarded by both, buyers and suppliers. It could be an indication 
that buyer customization is regarded as a natural consequence in their rela-
tionship with suppliers, and therefore, does not play an important role in sup-
plier performance. That is, a major role here is performed by supplier customi-
zation. 75 
3.8  Limitations and Future Research 
Our findings should be considered with the acknowledgement of several limita-
tions. First, we gain insight into how different suppliers evaluate organizational 
buying behavior of one buying company, as a reference point for all suppliers. 
Therefore, it is difficult to generalize from this single case. Next, similarly to 
other dyadic studies, our informants from the buying company select suppliers 
for evaluation of the relationship their company has with the suppliers. Other 
dyadic studies could develop methods that enhance dyadic data collection in 
terms of improved methods of selection of respondents. Further research 
might also consider from diverse angles why suppliers customize to buyers. For 
example, our study does not provide any insights into the role of managers or 
company policy in the decision making process on customization. Other ques-
tions that could be asked refer to the extent of customization and a number of 
partners that focal companies customize to. It could be that suppliers as well as 
buyers practice mass customization.  
Second, our examination of close social relationship between buyers and 
suppliers focused specifically on tie strength. This study did not investigate the 
role of close social relationships with parties external to the dyad or from a 
triadic or a network perspective. External parties to the dyad such as govern-
ments, competitors, customers, and other stakeholders, could reveal important 
implications for close relationships, information sharing, customization and 
manufacturing performance in buyer-supplier relationships. Therefore, re-
searchers should investigate data from multiple sources. Additionally, although 
our sample constitutes 103 matched pairs, that meets an average dyadic study 
dataset (Kenny et al., 2006), this might pose a limitation to our study. Despite 
the inherent difficulties in dyadic data collection, research design and analysis, 
researchers should strive for larger sample sizes.  
Third, testing the causality of the relationships in our dyadic model was 
not possible because we used cross-sectional data; thus, conducting experi-
mental studies and the collection and analysis of longitudinal data should be 
the goals of further research. However, it could be extremely difficult since 
there are already a number of practical difficulties with collecting cross-
sectional dyadic data. Furthermore, case studies as well could be used to pro-  76 
vide richer data in dyadic research settings (Lawson et al., 2008), not only 
cross-sectional, but also longitudinal. 
Another interesting path of evolution for studies on close social relation-
ships and information sharing is the role of web-based communication portals. 
We look forward to studies on how not only impersonal web-based communi-
cation channels, in addition to the existing interpersonal channels, enhance the 
quality of information sharing and providing feedback as well as other benefits 



















3.9 Appendix  3 
MEASUREMENTS INSTRUMENTS CHAPTER 3 




(α)  CR AVE 
Buyer close relationship (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001)    0,80 0.54 
 
Our employees share close social relations with the employees 
from this supplier.  0.772    
  We feel indebted to this supplier for what they have done for us.  0.803    
 
We expect that we will be working with this supplier far into the 
future. 0.626    
       
Supplier close relationship (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001)    0.78 0.54 
 
Our employees share close social relations with the employees 
from Buyer X.  0.665    
  We feel indebted to Buyer X for what they have done for us.  0.759    
  We expect that we will be working with Buyer X far into the future. 0.771    
       
Supplier information sharing (Mohr and Spekman, 1994)    0.93 0.74 
  This supplier informs us in advance about their changing needs.  0.786    
 
This supplier is providing us with all the information we need to 
serve them best.  0.887    
 
This supplier keeps us informed about events that may affect our 
company.   0.851    
 
This supplier keeps us informed about changes that may affect our 
company.   0.913    
  The information provided by this supplier is reliable.  0.859    
       
Buyer information sharing (Mohr and Spekman, 1994)    0.94 0.77 
 
The following Buyer X departments inform us in advance about 
their changing needs.   0.898    
 
The following Buyer X departments are providing us with all the 
information we need to serve them best.   0.878    
 
Buyer X keeps us informed about events that may affect our com-
pany.  0.866    
 
Buyer X keeps us informed about changes that may affect our 
company.   0.911    
 
The information provided by the different Buyer X departments is 
reliable.   0.825    
       
Buyer customization (Palmatier et al., 2007)      
  Comparing to other suppliers:    0.88 0.56   78 
  This supplier receives special treatment from us.  0.805    
  This supplier receives special information from us.  0.820    
 
This supplier receives special value-added benefits from us (e.g., 
inventory control, expediting, training).  0.743    
 
We have made specific investments for this supplier (e.g. EDI, 
packaging, delivery, KANBAN).  0.722    
  We adapt our procedures to this supplier’s requirements.  0.791    
  We assigned additional dedicated personnel to this supplier.  0.581    
       
Supplier customization (Palmatier et al., 2007)      
  Comparing to other buyers:    0.86 0.46 
  Buyer X receives special treatment from us.  0.681     
 
Buyer X receives invitations to special internal events (internal 
managerial meetings, engineering day, customer day) organized by 
our company.  0.669     
  Buyer X receives special information from us.  0.663     
 
Buyer X receives special value-added benefits from us (e.g., inven-
tory control, expediting, training).  0.617    
 
We have made specific investments for Buyer X (e.g. EDI, packag-
ing, delivery, KANBAN).  0.690    
  We adapt our procedures to Buyer X requirements.  0.706    
  We assigned additional dedicated personnel to Buyer X.  0.699    
       
Buyer satisfaction with feedback (exploratory phase of the study)    0.92 0.69 
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from this supplier 
about their ability to meet our quality requirements.  0.788    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from this supplier 
about their ability to meet our delivery times.   0.810    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from this supplier 
about their ability to meet our product development require-
ments. 0.904    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from this supplier 
about their ability to meet our process development requirements. 0.930    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from this supplier 
about their ability to meet our total cost reduction requirements.   0.701    
       
Supplier satisfaction with feedback (exploratory phase of the study)    0.96 0.82 
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following 
Buyer X departments about our quality performance. 0.907    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following 
Buyer X departments about our delivery performance.  0.899    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following 
Buyer X departments about our product development perform-
ance.   0.918    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following 
Buyer X departments about our process development perform-
ance.   0.949    79 
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the following 
Buyer X departments about our total cost reduction performance.  0.851    
       
Buyer affective commitment (Kumar et al., 1994)    0.85 0.66 
 
It is pleasant working with this supplier that is why we continue the 
relationship. 0.863    
  We want to remain a customer to this supplier.  0.862    
 
Our decision to remain a customer of this supplier is based on our 
attraction to the things that this supplier represents as a company 
(e.g., image, brand, reference).  0.692    
       
Supplier affective commitment (Kumar et al., 1994)    0.86 0.67 
 
It is pleasant working with Buyer X that is why we continue the 
relationship. 0.786    
  We want to remain a supplier to Buyer X.  0.861    
 
Our decision to remain a supplier for Buyer X is based on our 
attraction to the things that Buyer X represents as a company (e.g., 
image, brand, reference).  0.805     




Man vs Machine: The Roles of Close Social 
Relationships with Employees and 
an Enterprise Information Portal (EIP) in 
Information Sharing Behavior 
and Its Outcomes 
This study extends existing information sharing research by demonstrating the 
moderating effect of EIP between close social relationships and information 
sharing behavior. In contrast with other information sharing studies, this re-
search investigates the influence of EIP on three components of information 
sharing behavior, i.e., the extent of information shared, the evaluation of that 
extent (communication quality) and joint efforts of buyers and suppliers to ad-
just that extent (participation). Our results indicate that according to suppliers, 
EIP intensifies the effect of close social relationships on cross-functional infor-
mation sharing behavior. Additionally, cross-functional information sharing 
behavior prompts supplier satisfaction with feedback. A number of suggestions 
for managing such a situation are offered. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 Over the last decade a number of communication technology solutions have 
entered buyer-supplier collaboration. These solutions represent not only data 
warehousing or customer relationship management but also enterprise re-
source planning, vendor managed inventory and enterprise information portals 
(EIP). This recent technological development in supply chain is characterized by 
a massive growth in worldwide communication methods and opportunities 
(Fernandes, Raja and Austin, 2005). Existing communication systems such as 
electronic data interchange and enterprise resource planning are frequently 
combined with the internet to form a new type of communications that are 
broadly labeled ‘portals’ (Gerst and Bunduchi, 2005; Puschmann and Alt, 2005). 
Such portals are supportive means for information sharing to spread and ac-
quire knowledge from their business partners.  
Companies share information by using information portals, extranets, 
computer-to-computer information exchange or electronic data interchange 
(Emmelhainz, 1990). Each of these types of portals has its own specific charac-
teristics, but the general idea, that information – and simultaneously knowl-
edge – is spread via an electronic system, remains. In this paper we refer to 
enterprise information portals (EIPs). An EIP is broadly defined as “a knowledge 
portal whose main function it is to assist members in obtaining specialized 
knowledge through various learning processes” (Ryu, Kim, Chaudhury and Rao, 
2005, p.246). An EIP thus stresses the importance of knowledge sharing. A 
common characteristic among EIPs is the integration of existing business proc-
esses in order to reduce costs and to create effective communication channels 
with external parties (Yang, Cai, Zhou and Zhou, 2005). The term portal was 
defined for the first time in a Merrill Lynch report, by Shilakes and Tylman 
(1998) as: “an applications that enables companies to unlock internally and 
externally stored information, and provide users a single gateway to personal-
ized information needed to make informed business decisions” (Shilakes and 
Tylman, 1998, p.1). In subsequent years, many definitions have been suggested 
with respect to portals  (Aneja, Brooksby and Rowan, 2000; Kendler, 2000). 
Starting from the Gartner Group definition, a supplier portal is therefore a 
technological solution providing a unified application access, information man-
agement, and knowledge management both within enterprises and between 83 
enterprises and their suppliers, trading partners, and channel partners. Supplier 
portals are first of all designed to improve efficiency in transactions with the 
supplier base and to improve coordination of the logistics flows between buyer 
and suppliers (Balgieri, Secchi and Croom, 2007). In 1999, 3 car manufacturers 
(GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler) founded a company “NewCo” as an independ-
ent automotive exchange that was later renamed Covisint (Arbin and Essler, 
2005) and became a part of Compuware Corporation. The aim of this company 
was to independently exchange online automotive information and creating 
the world’s largest online marketplace for OEMs and their suppliers. 
Buyers and suppliers continue to invest in communication technology solu-
tions, alike, to enhance the use of these solutions, with an ultimate goal of 
boosting their company’ businesses and relationships (Sambamurthy, Bhar-
dawaj and Grover, 2003). Suppliers implement customer relationship manage-
ment programs to foster close social relationships with important buyers in 
their customer portfolio to increase supplier performance and competitive 
advantage (Ryals and Rogers, 2007). Buyers, on the other hand, implement 
enterprise information portals to share necessary operational information with 
their suppliers. Currently, enterprise information portals are believed to be the 
most suitable technological solutions for answering the need of cooperation 
and strategic relationships between buyers and suppliers (Baglieri and Secchi, 
2007). As communication technology develops, it turns into a useful tool for 
shaping strategies and enhancing competitive advantage (Bharadwaj, 2000; 
Johnston and Vitale, 1988; Nevo and Wade, 2010). However, even though prior 
research has demonstrated communication technology to improve perform-
ance (Baglieri and Secchi, 2007), important questions about how and why these 
technological solutions increase performance, remain unanswered 
(Sambamurthy et al., 2003). Furthermore, while enterprise information portals 
(EIPs) ought to offer a gateway to a customized and personalized approach 
(Scheepers, 2006), little attention has been paid to internet-enhanced supply 
chain relationships (Liu, Boër, Sacco and Fornasiero, 2006). Outcomes of such 
relationships are vague, with hardly any evidence on how the use of portals 
could increase intrinsic company behavior, such as information sharing. Despite 
widespread research on buyer–supplier relationships, we lack any evidence on 
whether close social relationships contribute to information sharing behavior. 
Moreover, even though communication technology does not replace direct   84 
personal contact between buyers and suppliers, so far, we lack sufficient un-
derstanding of how the use of portals may enhance the impact of close social 
relationships on information sharing behavior.  
The purpose of this paper is therefore to broaden understanding of the 
role of EIP and close social relationships in cross-functional information sharing 
behavior. We aim to explore how personal contact and communication tech-
nology can support or constrain communication behavior in buyer-supplier 
relationships. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, we argue that EIP en-
hances the impact of close social relationships on information sharing behavior. 
We also propose that information sharing behavior, in turn, improves supplier’s 
satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance.   
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we explain our conceptual framework 
and the development of our hypotheses. Next, we describe our methodological 
approach. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of the results. We 
conclude with managerial implications and recommendations for future re-
search.  
4.2 Conceptual  Framework 
In this section, we present our model that builds on the premise that close 
social relationships contribute to information sharing behavior that leads to an 
improved relationship. The model consists of three main building blocks: close 
social relationships, outcomes of these close social relationships (information 
sharing, communication quality and participation), outcomes of information 
sharing behavior (supplier satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on supplier 
performance) and a moderating effect of an enterprise information portal. 
4.2.1  Close Social Relationships 
In social network theory a social relationship, regardless of its strength and 
closeness, refers to a tie (Seibert et al., 2001). In this study we focus on a close 
social relationship because in network closure theory it provides more benefits 
than a distant one (Ahuja, 2000; Cohen, 1988). In contrast to a ‘distant’ rela-
tionship a close social relationship is characterized by a higher level of intimacy, 85 
reciprocity and indebtedness (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Rindfleisch and 
Moorman, 2001) and refers to a personal contact between a buyer’s and a 
supplier’s employees (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). 
 




Dense, close social relationships tend to be more beneficial than distant, loose 
ones in network theory as well as in social capital theory (Ahuja, 2000; Cohen, 
1988; Lin et al., 2001; Uzzi, 1997). The superiority of close social relationships 
originates from their association with access to sensitive information (e.g., 
Granovetter, 1973), privileged information, or even privileged economic re-
sources such as subsidized loans or protected markets (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 
1998). 
In general, information sharing refers to the extent that a party in a rela-
tionship reveals information that may affect the other party’s operations 
(Heide and Miner, 1992). In close relationships such information sharing en-
compasses formal and informal exchange of meaningful and timely information 
(Mohr and Nevin, 1990). Information sharing is one of the three components of 
communication behavior that is the extent of information shared, the assess-
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Thereafter, we will refer to information sharing behavior instead of communi-
cation behavior. The extent refers to sharing information about planning, fore-
casting and events and changes that may affect the other party. The assess-
ment of this extent relates to the essential characteristics of shared informa-
tion such as the timeliness, accuracy, completeness, satisfaction and reliability 
of information and we refer to it as to communication quality. Another infor-
mation sharing component, the joint effort to adjust information refers to co-
creation of a shared vision in developing forecasts, setting goals, planning and 
forecasting activities as well as joining efforts in improvement. Joint effort to 
adjust information considers the scope to which buyers and suppliers engage 
jointly in planning and goals setting and we refer to it as to participation 
(Simsek, Lubatkin and Floyd, 2003).  
Close social relationships, because of their abovementioned characteris-
tics, encourage the exchange of rich, sensitive and far more frequent and de-
tailed information than distant loose relationships (Kraatz, 1998; McEvily and 
Marcus, 2005; Uzzi, 1999). Prior studies found that more information is shared 
with those with whom a close relationship is established (Friedkin, 1982; Jack, 
2005; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Zaccaro and Lowe, 1988). Studies on 
socially related phenomena in social capital argue that those who have close 
social relationships receive information faster than those with distant, loose 
relationships (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998). Furthermore, a social relationship 
serves as a channel for information flow (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and antici-
pates the development of a shared vision in a buyer-supplier relationship 
(Krackhardt, 1990). Thus, we suggest:  
 
H1: A close social relationship has a positive impact on information sharing. 
H2: A close social relationship has a positive impact on communication quality. 
H3: A close social relationship has a positive impact on participation. 
4.2.2  Cross-Functional Information Sharing Behavior and Its Outcomes 
Prior studies found that cross-functional information sharing in a buyer-
supplier relationship contributes to increased manufacturing performance 
better than if information takes place only between purchasing and sales func-
tions (Carter and Miller, 1989). Manufacturing performance improvement re-87 
fers to improvement of cost reductions, quality, flexibility and delivery (e.g., 
Fynes et al., 2005; Möller and Törrönen, 2003). Supplier manufacturing per-
formance represents the buyer’s evaluation of satisfaction with the supplier’s 
record in terms of meeting the buyer’s manufacturing expectations. A Buyer 
evaluates the expectations on a range of performance metrics (Cannon and 
Perreault Jr., 1999). A buyer informs the supplier about the result of the 
evaluation that represents the buyer’s satisfaction with supplier performance, 
via feedback. Satisfaction with feedback entails not only the acceptance of 
performance metrics ratings but also the feedback itself (Jawahar, 2006). As a 
result, it is a more significant indicator of supplier reactions to evaluation feed-
back from a buyer (Giles and Mossholder, 1990) than its usefulness or precision 
(Keeping and Levy, 2000). Because information sharing in general enhances 
performance in a supply chain (Mabert and Venkataramanan, 1998) in our 
study we extend the investigation to the influence of cross-functional informa-
tion sharing behavior on a supplier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer. If 
various departments and/or functions of a buyer share information with a sup-
plier as well as join their efforts to adjust information, they enhance the sup-
plier’s satisfaction with feedback on performance. This happens because then 
the supplier has more visibility in processes as well as more understanding of 
operations of the buyer (Mabert and Venkataramanan, 1998). Furthermore, 
since timeliness, accuracy, completeness, satisfaction and reliability, referred as 
communication quality, are characteristics of the assessment of the extent of 
information (Wang and Wei, 2007), they would improve performance as well. 
 
H4:  Information sharing has a positive impact on a supplier’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance. 
H5:  Communication quality has a positive impact on a supplier’s satisfaction 
with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance. 
H6:  Participation has a positive impact on a supplier’s satisfaction with feed-
back from a buyer on supplier performance. 
4.2.3  The Moderating Role of EIP Use 
Organizations are investing in EIPs to promote and facilitate the sharing of in-
formation (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). Enterprise information portals (EIPs)   88 
deliver information to its users who together form an online knowledge com-
munity (Chan and Chung, 2002). Communication technology solutions such as 
EIPs integrate rules for communications, i.e., reuse of knowledge, and create a 
connection between various organizational functions and the location of 
knowledge to ascertain that information is directly tied to realization (Ryu et 
al., 2005).  Because of a scale of EIPs implementations with thousands of users 
(Scheepers, 2006), they can alter the company’s internal and external relation-
ships by boosting the capabilities of a company’s information management 
(Balgieri et al., 2007). EIPs have therefore become important tools to facilitate 
information exchange and thereby co-operation and collaboration in supply 
chains (Klein, 2007; Laukkanen, Sarpola and Kemppainen, 2007; Malhotra, Go-
sain and El Sawy, 2005). Information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
like EIPs have in this respect a positive impact on the transactional and physical 
side of the buyer-supplier relationship’ processes (Balgieri et al., 2007). Multi-
ple  studies argued a significant impact of ICTs on supply chains integration 
(Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2004; Johnson and Whang, 2002; Lancioni, Schau and 
Smith, 2003; Rai, Patnayakuni and Seth, 2006). Current research in this area 
focused mainly on the effects of ICT on the efficiency of exchange-related 
process in a buyer-supplier relationship (Balgieri et al., 2007). Spekman and 
Carraway (2006) argue that using an EIP to collaborate with partners can en-
hance processes between companies. Hence: 
 
H7a:  The use of an EIP has a positive moderating effect on the relationship 
between a close social relationship and information sharing. 
H7b:  The use of an EIP has a positive moderating effect on the relationship 
between a close social relationship and communication quality. 
H7c:  The use of an EIP has a positive moderating effect on the relationship 
between a close social relationship and participation. 89 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Research  Setting 
To empirically validate our hypotheses the data was collected through an 
online survey (Deutskens et al., 2004) of users of an advanced EIP. We ap-
proached suppliers of a single, core buying company as potential participants in 
the empirical study, to exclude contextual effects and allow for a single frame 
of reference as they were all using the same portal. The buying company se-
lected for this study was a large multinational manufacturer with total annual 
turnover of close to 3 billion euro that was a part of a global industrial group 
with headquarters located in Europe. As we describe in chapter 1, for this study 
we used a sample of 185 data points from suppliers. 
4.3.2 Measurement  Instruments   
This study adopted extant validated scales where possible, and elsewhere, new 
scales were adopted based on literature. The scale for a close relationship in-
cluded items introduced by Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) where a strong 
close social relationship characterizes with closeness, reciprocity and indebted-
ness. The items were measured on seven-point Likert-type scales of agreement 
ranging from 1 = “completely disagree” to 7 = “completely agree”. Appendix 4 
presents an overview of all measures used in this study. 
The remaining constructs (information sharing, communication quality, 
participation, satisfaction with feedback) were measured on a seven-point 
Likert-type scales ranging from 1 = “never” to 7 = “always”. We adapted the 
measurement items for information sharing behavior from Mohr and Spekman 
(1994). In this paper information sharing behavior consists of three compo-
nents, i.e., the extent of information shared (information sharing), the assess-
ment of the extent (communication quality) and the joint efforts to adjust it as 
a shared vision (participation). Information sharing behavior was evaluated by 
suppliers as coming from five departments of the buying company, i.e., pur-
chasing, production, engineering, quality and accounting. For the analysis the 
scores of each indicator were taken to calculate a mean score for each indica-
tor of every component of information sharing behavior.    90 
We used semi-structured interviews of the exploratory phase of our data col-
lection as the basis for the development of a five-item scale of satisfaction with 
feedback. Feedback not only serves as a motivational technique, but the con-
tent of feedback may include manufacturing performance metrics (Kim, 1984). 
Thus, in our study, we collected data on supplier’s satisfaction with feedback 
from a buyer on not only cost reductions, quality and delivery terms but also 
improvements in new product and new process development. Suppliers evalu-
ated their satisfaction with feedback that they receive from five departments 
of the buying company, i.e., purchasing, production, engineering, quality and 
accounting. We calculated a mean score for each indicator for further analysis.  
Furthermore, the exploratory phase of our data collection contributed to 
the development of the measures of EIP. The EIP was measured with ten items, 
but those ten items comprised five pairs comprised of two items each. The two 
items referred to the clearness and reliability of forecasts, specifications, draw-
ings, pricelists and quality rejection data.  
For the control variables, we measured the power of the buyer with a 
four-item construct we adapted from Mohr et al. (1996), dependence with a 
four-item construct based on (Geyskens et al., 1996; Kumar et al., 1994) and 
relationship length using the measure provided by Jap and Ganesan (2000).  
4.4 Findings 
4.4.1 Analysis  Approach 
We chose partial least square (PLS) path modeling with latent variables, as 
implemented in SmartPLS, to obtain the parameter estimates in the measure-
ment and structural models (Chin, 1998; Ringle, 2006a; Ringle et al., 2005, 
2007). Our choice of PLS path modeling, or component-based structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM), over covariance-based SEM was due to its robustness 
with regard to multivariate normality and its limited constraints on the meas-
urement levels of the manifest variables or sample size (Chin, 1998; Tenenhaus 
et al., 2005). A component-based SEM approach also allows for the application 
of complex models that include many constructs and indicators and/or rela-
tionships (Chin, 1998).  91 
 4.4.2 Psychometric Properties 
The assessed psychometric properties of the measurement instruments, with  
the use of SmartPLS, included reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant 
validity (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). For empirical tests, the assessment of com-
posite reliability (CR) assures for the internal consistency and reliability of re-
flective constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Wetzels et al., 2009), average 
variance extracted (AVE), and factor loadings (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). 
Similar guidelines apply to investigations of content, convergent, and discrimi-
nant validity (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006). For our constructs all CRs 
exceeded the cut-off value of .7, and the AVEs exceeded .5 (see Appendix 4). In 
support of convergent validity, every item’s standardized loading on its respec-
tive construct was greater than .5 (Hulland, 1999). Discriminant validity was 
satisfactory when constructs shared more variance with their own measures 
than with other constructs in the model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), that is the 
value of the square root of the AVE exceeded the construct’s intercorrelations 
(see Table 4.1). 
Because we collected our data using a questionnaire, we checked for 
common method variance (CMV), which may influence the modeled relation-
ships, using Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Specifically, 
we entered all the items together into a factor analysis (principal components 
analysis [PCA] with an unrotated solution). In case that a single factor solution 
emerged or one general factor accounted for most of the variance, CMV would 
pose a threat (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In our study, we included 43 items, 
and the PCA analysis produced a nine-factor solution. The first factor explained 
40.46% of the variance. The unrotated solution did not reveal one general fac-
tor. Therefore, CMV is not a concern.  
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Table 4.1 Intercorrelations of the Latent Variables 
a 
Construct  M  SD  1 2 4 5 6 7 
1. Close Social Relationship  4.74 1.06 0.73       
2. Communication Quality   5.45 1.12 0.47 0.95      
4. EIP  4.88 1.38 0.36 0.49 0.82     
5. Information sharing  4.65 1.32 0.44 0.75 0.58 0.89    
6. Participation  4.39 1.44 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.78 0.86   
7. Satisfaction with Feedback 5.04 1.36 0.43 0.77 0.46 0.76 0.71 0.93 
a Square root of AVE on the diagonal           
4.4.3 Hypotheses  Testing 
In line with our expectations, our empirical results support all of our 7 hypothe-
ses (Table 4.2). 
To assess the fit of our data to the model in SmartPLS, we used the R² val-
ues of the endogenous constructs (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). According to Cohen 
(1988), values of R² of .02, .13, and .26 indicate small, medium and large effect 
sizes, respectively, of the treatment independent of sample sizes. 
 
Table 4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses Path  CoefficientT-Value Result 
Close social relationship -> information sharing (H1)  0.21   3.65**  Supported 
Close social relationship -> communication quality (H2)  0.24   3.90**  Supported 
Close social relationship -> participation (H3)  0.26   3.79**  Supported 
Information sharing -> satisfaction with feedback (H4) 0.25    3.65**  Supported 
Communication quality -> satisfaction with feedback (H5) 0.45    5.81**  Supported 
Participation -> satisfaction with feedback (H6)  0.26   3.60**  Supported 
EIP -> close social relationship -information sharing (H7a)  0.16 2.31*    Supported 
EIP -> close social relationship-communication quality (H7b) 0.24   2.99**  Supported 
EIP -> close social relationship-participation (H7c)  0.21   3.32**  Supported 
*p < .05, **p < .01, one-tailed tests. n.s. = not significant.   
 
The individual values for R² indicated that the model explained 45.46% of the 
variance in information sharing, 46.0% of communication quality, 41.17% of 
participation, and 69.24% of satisfaction with feedback (see Figure 4.2). As a 
global fit measure, we used a formula developed by Tenenhaus et al. (2005). 
Relative to the medium-sized effects in our model, the evaluated fit of .55 indi-
cated a good fit of the data to the model (Wetzels et al., 2009).  
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Figure 4.2 Empirical Findings 
 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, one-tailed tests 
4.5 Discussion 
This study has several significant findings .  S o  f a r ,  m o s t  o f  e x t a n t  l i t e r a t u r e  
studying close social relationships associated them with rich and detailed in-
formation (Kraatz, 1998; McEvily and Marcus, 2005; Uzzi, 1999). In line with our 
suggestions (H1, H2 & H3) and earlier studies (e.g., Friedkin, 1982) close social 
relationships have positive impact on cross-functional information sharing be-
havior in a buyer-supplier relationship. We also stated that an EIP enhances the 
linkage between relationship closeness and information sharing behavior (H7a, 
H7b & H7c). Our empirical results fully support this. Further, the study also 
found that consistent with our arguments, cross-functional information sharing 
behavior has a positive impact on supplier satisfaction with feedback from a 
buyer on supplier performance (H4, H5 & H6). This result extends previous 
findings that information sharing increases performance (Joshi, 2009; Krause et 
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4.6 Managerial  Implications 
Even though communication technology has become very popular in buyer-
supplier relationships it does not replace close social relationships between 
employees of a buyer and a supplier. Our empirical results provide evidence on 
the intensifying effects of the EIP on the linkage between close social relation-
ships and cross-functional information sharing behavior. Therefore, this re-
search offers several suggestions to managers about how information should 
be shared with suppliers to prevent from problems to occur in cross-functional 
information sharing process. We propose some measures that managers may 
apply in case that close social relationships exist between buyer’ and supplier’ 
employees so that these close social relationships do not disturb the informa-
tion sharing process via an EIP. We suggest that managers could take several 
actions to prepare buyer and supplier employees to the usage of an EIP to fully 
enjoy the benefits that it may bring to cross-functional information sharing 
behavior. For example, one of the actions could be enhancing the use of the 
portal by the employees of the buying company before they share any opinions 
with the employees of the supplying company. Further, managers could incor-
porate special procedures of sharing information related to information avail-
able on the portal, so that employees who are not contributing to the informa-
tion input on the portal are not interfering with it. The exploratory stage of our 
data collection, the semi-structured interviews indicated that the users of the 
portal received limited training and were left alone for learning the new func-
tions in case of updates. This could imply some negative effects of the use of 
EIP on how cross-functional information sharing behavior is evaluated by sup-
pliers. Management may attempt to fix this situation by encouraging portal 
users’ (supplier’ and buyer’ employees) self-efficacy (skills and confidence) for 
change and favorable opinions toward the new way of sharing information 
(Kim and Kankanhalli, 2009). Management would have to establish a campaign 
stressing the benefits of the use of the portal. To develop positive attitudes 
among portal users managers would need to strive for persuading opinion 
leaders within buyer and supplier companies to not only accept the change but 
also its necessity (Massey, Montoya-Weiss and Brown, 2001). The persuaded 
leaders can then become promotors of the online portal (Kim and Kankanhalli, 
2009) and the information available through it. Therefore, managers need to 95 
increase the perceived value of the portal and the subsequent change in the 
information sharing process in a buyer-supplier relationship. To achieve that 
they need to decrease users’ resistance to information on the portal by increas-
ing organizational support for change, this would encourage the creation of 
trust in information on that portal. Organizational support for change would 
need to take the form of training of the portal users and additional resources to 
which users could apply for guidance (Kim and Kankanhalli, 2009). Only in that 
way could users attach more value to the information available via the portal. 
This would also prevent from any possible negative effects of automated in-
formation sharing on the linkage between close social relationships and cross-
functional information sharing behavior.  
Another implication from our study concerns the influence of cross-
functional information sharing behavior on supplier satisfaction with feedback 
from a buyer on supplier performance. For suppliers it is very important to 
receive feedback on their performance. However, suppliers need to accept this 
feedback, because without acceptance they will not change. Satisfaction with 
feedback represents a measure of supplier acceptance of performance meas-
urements. Therefore, managers could use cross-functional information sharing 
as a significant factor in making suppliers accept their performance evaluations.   
 4.7  Limitations and Future Research 
Our results should be interpreted with the acknowledgement of its limitations. 
First, the data was collected from suppliers of a single buying company with a 
specific online portal. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize from this single 
case. Other studies could replicate this study across other online B2B portals 
and industries. Further research might also consider from diverse perspectives 
why suppliers look for direct contact and how such behavior influences the 
performance outcomes (e.g., Dyer, 1996) provided the use of information por-
tals. For example, our study does not provide any insights into the role of man-
agers or providers of information as an input to the portals in the information 
sharing process. Future research could examine the influence of portals and the 
roles of direct contact in information sharing and close collaboration once an 
implementation of the portal has ended and all its functionality has been in 
usage for collaboration in a buyer-supplier relationship. Our exploratory part of   96 
data collection reveals that suppliers do not trust the information on the portal 
and therefore engage in direct contact with employees to confirm information, 
which might have negative effects on close collaboration and information shar-
ing. We enhance researchers to test this postulation. Furthermore, future re-
search could examine the influence of different information referents as opin-
ion makers on the performance of information portals in a buyer-supplier rela-
tionship. Other studies could refer to the extent of the use of a portal for shar-
ing information at different levels with suppliers from various categories from 
Kraljic matrix (Kraljic, 1983). It could be that various supplier categories require 
different information sharing policy via an online portal. This could mean less 
attention from a buyer to a routine supplier’s training on the portal usage than 
to a strategic supplier. Implications of such policies on performance of a buyer-
supplier relationship remain unknown. Furthermore, it could also be interesting 
to measure the content and frequency of interaction in direct contact with 
employees to confirm information on a portal, which might prove valuable for 
investigations of information sharing in close collaboration. Supply chain man-
agement research on information sharing could extend our study by taking into 
account the coping model of user adaptation (Beaudry and Pinsonneault, 
2005). In the coping model users assess the threats and opportunities of an 
online portal and choose a strategy to adapt to it. Because, obtaining informa-
tion about the same is costly and redundant (Hansen, 1999), user adaptation 
strategies could have tremendous effects on performance in a buyer-supplier 
relationship. While this study focuses only on the different influences of an 
information portal on close relationships and information sharing, future stud-
ies might find it interesting to examine how portal users evaluate information 
on the portal and what effects it has on their information-search actions. 
Finally, testing the causality of the relationships in our model was not pos-
sible because we used cross-sectional data; which creates opportunities for 
conducting experimental studies and the collection and analysis of longitudinal 
data. Furthermore, case studies as well could be used to provide richer data 
and in dyadic research settings (Lawson et al., 2008), not only cross-sectional, 
but also longitudinal. 
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4.8 Appendix  4 
MEASUREMENTS INSTRUMENTS CHAPTER 4 




(α)  CR AVE 
       
Supplier close social relationship (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001)    0.77 0.53 
 
Our employees share close social relations with the employees 
from Buyer X.  0.742    
  We feel indebted to Buyer X for what they have done for us.  0.706    
 
We expect that we will be working with Buyer X far into the 
future. 0.730    
       
Buyer information sharing (Mohr and Spekman, 1994)      
 
departments included: engineering, production, quality, pur-
chasing and accounting      
Information sharing     0.95 0.79 
 
The following Buyer X departments inform us in advance about 
their changing needs.   0.900    
 
The following Buyer X departments are providing us with all 
the information we need to serve them best.   0.914    
 
Buyer X keeps us informed about events that may affect our 
company. 0.888    
 
Buyer X keeps us informed about changes that may affect our 
company.   0.917    
 
The information provided by the different Buyer X depart-
ments is reliable.   0.832    
       
Communication quality     0.98 0.90 
 
The communication of the following Buyer X  departments 
with our company is on time.  0.932    
 
The communication of the following Buyer X  departments 
with our company is accurate.  0.961    
 
The communication of the following Buyer X  departments 
with our company is complete.  0.964    
 
The communication of the following Buyer X  departments 
with our company is satisfactory.  0.946    
 
The communication of the following Buyer X  departments 
with our company is reliable.  0.946    
       
Participation     0.95 0.75 
  The following Buyer X departments ask us for our advice.  0.897      98 
Construct Item 
Loading 
(α)  CR AVE 
 
The following Buyer X departments ask us to participate in goal 
setting. 0.899    
 
The following Buyer X departments ask us to participate in 
planning activities.  0.867    
 
The following Buyer X departments encourage us to come with 
suggestions for improvements.  0.904    
 
The following Buyer X departments ask us to participate in 
forecasting activities.  0.777    
  The following Buyer X departments are collaborative.  0.831    
       
Enterprise Information Portal (EIP; exploratory phase of the study)    0.95 0.67 
  All forecasts that can be found on EIP are clear.  0.770    
  All forecasts that can be found on EIP are reliable.  0.675    
  All specifications that can be found on EIP are clear.  0.874    
  All specifications that can be found on EIP are reliable  0.859    
  All drawings that can be found on EIP are clear.  0.821    
  All drawings that can be found on EIP are reliable.  0.835    
  All pricelists that can be found on EIP are clear.  0.811    
  All pricelists that can be found on EIP are reliable.  0.840    
  All quality rejection data that can be found on EIP are clear.  0.848    
  All quality rejection data that can be found on EIP are reliable.  0.827     
       
Supplier satisfaction with feedback (exploratory phase of the study)    0.97 0.86 
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the follow-
ing Buyer X departments about our quality performance.  0.921    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the follow-
ing Buyer X departments about our delivery performance.  0.907    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the follow-
ing Buyer X departments about our product development 
performance.   0.940    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the follow-
ing Buyer X departments about our process development 
performance.   0.956    
 
We are satisfied with the feedback we receive from the follow-
ing Buyer X departments about our total cost reduction per-
formance. 0.908    
Notes: α = coefficient alpha, CR = composite reliability, AVE = average variance ex-
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5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the impact of one of the human fac-
tors, namely close social relationships between employees of a buyer’ and a 
supplier’ company, on resource exchanges (i.e., preferential benefits, customi-
zation, information) in a buyer-supplier relationship. We emphasize the impor-
tance of close social relationships and ascertain several benefits they may bring 
both to buyers and suppliers. This chapter presents a brief summary of the 
empirical findings of the three studies carried out in our research followed by 
the implications section. The dissertation concludes by providing directions for 
future research. 
5.2 Synopsis 
Today, many supply markets have evolved into seller’s markets in which buyers 
have to compete with each other to attract the resources (i.e., preferential 
benefits, customization, and information) from suppliers that are needed to 
create value in a buyer-supplier relationship. This dissertation investigates how 
close social relationships help both buying and supplying companies increase 
the benefits they get from exchanging resources in a buyer-supplier relation-
ship. In particular, we focus on three main concerns of buying companies. 
First, we demonstrate that, from a supplier’s point of view, buyer invest-
ments in supplier development indeed do not assure buyers of direct access to 
preferential resources (preferential benefits) from suppliers. However, buyer 
investments in supplier development increase supplier’s trust and commitment 
to a buyer (relational capital) as well as a supplier’s participation in creating a 
joint future with the buyer (cognitive capital). The close social relationship 
plays a mediating role between relational and cognitive capitals and preferen-
tial resources from suppliers. Additionally, suppliers also increase their out-
comes when granting preferential resources to a buyer. More specifically, they 
increase their sales and economic performance in a relationship with a buyer.  
Second, we find that, from a dyadic perspective, a close social relationship 
plays a different role for buyers than for suppliers when it comes to buyer and 
supplier customization. For buyers close social relationships have a direct and 101 
positive effect on buyer customization, but for suppliers not. Suppliers require 
specific cross-functional information about buyer operations from a buyer be-
fore they start to customize to the buyer. Referring to customization, buyer 
customization proves not to be relevant for either supplier satisfaction with 
buyer feedback on supplier performance or buyer satisfaction with supplier 
ability to meet buyer requirements. In contrast, supplier customization is im-
portant for a buying company as it provides information on whether the sup-
plier is willing and able to meet the growing buyer requirements. This supplier 
ability to meet buyer requirements as well as supplier satisfaction with buyer 
feedback on supplier performance both contribute to the supplier’s affective 
commitment to the relationship with the buyer. Additionally, if the buyer is 
satisfied with the supplier’s ability to meet buyer’ requirements then the buyer 
as well develops affective commitment to the relationship with the performing 
supplier. Satisfaction with feedback, thus, seems to be an important antece-
dent for gluing the relationship between a buyer and a supplier. In conclusion, 
differentiating between two sides of a buyer-supplier relationship, our dyadic 
data analysis reveals that buyers and suppliers behave differently. 
Third, we show that from a supplier’s perspective a close social relation-
ship between employees of a buyer and a supplier increases cross-functional 
information sharing behavior of a buyer. When a buyer uses an enterprise in-
formation portal to share specific operational information with its suppliers 
(e.g., forecasts, specifications, drawings, pricelists, quality rejection data), it 
amplifies the effect of a close social relationship on a buyer’s cross-functional 
information sharing behavior as viewed by suppliers. Results also indicate that 
a positive attitude towards information sharing leads to an increase in the sup-
plier’s satisfaction with feedback from a buyer on supplier performance.  
In summary, the three studies show how a close social relationship con-
tributes in the exchange of resources in a buyer supplier relationship in terms 
of access to preferential benefits (chapter 2), customization (chapter 3) and 
information (chapter 4).   102 
5.3 Implications 
The empirical results of our three studies in this research demonstrate the 
importance of close social relationships. We do not consider close relationships 
in terms of partnerships, but as a cross-functional social relationship between 
employees from different departments (e.g. purchasing, production, quality, 
engineering, accounting, sales) of a buyer and a supplier. The main problem 
statement posed in the first chapter of this introduction is as follows: 
 
What is the impact of close social relationships on the exchange of 
resources in a buyer-supplier relationship? 
 
To answer the main problem statement and present several theoretical and 
managerial implications we draw on a large body of research on buyer-supplier 
relationships. Using a theoretical logic developed based on insights from social 
capital, network and information systems research in the area of purchasing 
and supply chain management each study results in a number of theoretical 
and managerial implications.  
Many studies investigate a buyer-supplier relationship at a firm-level (e.g., 
Wagner, 2006b). Purchasing officers act as boundary spanners between a 
buyer’s and a supplier’s company (Perrone et al., 2003). A purchasing officer is 
responsible for building a strong relationship with a supplier’s key account 
manager (KAM; Wu et al., 2010) as well as a supplier’s KAM is in charge of de-
veloping a strong relationship with a purchasing officer. However, the close 
interpersonal social relationships between the two have so far attracted very 
little academic attention (Wu et al., 2010). Additionally, to our knowledge there 
is no study that would focus on cross-functional social relationships between 
employees of a buyer and a supplier. Nowadays, as our exploratory interviews 
indicate, KAMs and purchasing officers are the most knowledgeable relation-
ship representatives, however, the employees of a buyer and a supplier have 
also direct contact and thus, build close social relationships with engineering, 
production, quality, accounting and purchasing. Because not only the mainte-
nance and support of a buyer-supplier relationship depends heavily on indi-
viduals (Tanner Jr., 1999) but also the exclusive exchange of resources, as our 103 
studies indicate, an employee-to-employee close social relationship should 
become of more interest to academia and practitioners.  
As shown in chapter 2, close social relationships, if cultivated with trust, 
commitment and joint efforts to build a shared future, will attract supplier’ 
preferential resources to a buyer. But in order to win the trust and commit-
ment of suppliers as well as their will to participate in creating a shared future 
with the buyer, the buyer has to commit its resources to not only evaluate the 
supplier’s performance against pre-defined targets but most of all to directly 
help the supplier to develop their capabilities at operational and strategic levels 
(i.e. supplier development). Similarly, chapter 3 shows that close social rela-
tionships between buyers and suppliers make the buyer allocate preferential 
treatment and adaptation to a supplier company.  
Second, companies need to consider the impact of close social relation-
ships on the information sharing behaviors of their partner companies. As 
shown in chapter 3, both buyers and suppliers have different needs with regard 
to receiving information from their partner companies. When suppliers con-
sider allocating preferential resources exclusively to a specific buyers they re-
quire extended and reliable information from that buyer. However, our case 
shows that sometimes buyers are not so collaborative and reluctant to share 
this kind of information with their suppliers. In our view, buyers need to learn 
to understand the reasons why suppliers have this information need and start 
to adapt to that, otherwise they will not achieve to get preferential resources 
from their suppliers. Also, network theory suggests that developing close social 
relationships can help buyers to learn how to respond more adaptively to their 
partner companies (Kraatz, 1998). Moreover, chapter 4 shows how important 
close social relationships are for suppliers in not only receiving information 
from a buyer company, but also for improving the quality of the different as-
pects of information sharing behavior, i.e. extent of information shared, as-
sessment of the information and joint efforts to adjust the information (Mohr 
and Spekman, 1994). If employees of a supplier develop close social relation-
ships with employees of a buyer, this helps the supplier company to access 
updated information that may affect the operations of the supplier (e.g. plan-
ning and/or forecasting quality). Additionally, through close social relationships 
a supplier can get access to information from a buyer in a timely manner, al-
lowing for more accurate, complete, satisfactory and reliable information. Fur-  104 
thermore, a close social relationship opens the opportunity for the supplier to 
engage in a co-creation of planning, goals setting as well as joining efforts in 
improvement (Simsek et al., 2003). These effects of close social relationships 
are even further amplified by the use of an enterprise information web-based 
portal. Therefore, a tool like an enterprise information portal should be care-
fully designed and incorporated in a buyer-supplier relationship in order to 
optimize the impacts that it may bring to both parties. 
Third, chapter 3 and chapter 4 show that cross-functional information 
sharing enhances the performance of both parties in a buyer-supplier relation-
ship (Mabert and Venkataramanan, 1998). However, for this to happen, buyers 
need to consider monitoring not the supplier performance metrics itself but 
rather the satisfaction of the supplier with the performance feedback as pro-
vided by the buyer. Because satisfaction with feedback entails not only the 
acceptance of the utilized performance metrics ratings but also the feedback 
itself (Jawahar, 2006). Therefore, we support earlier studies in their statement 
that satisfaction with feedback is a more significant indicator of supplier reac-
tions to evaluation feedback from a buyer (e.g., Giles and Mossholder, 1990) 
than its usefulness or precision (Keeping and Levy, 2000). Our empirical find-
ings of chapter 3 and chapter 4 sustain our statement on the role of cross-
functional information sharing behavior on the acceptance of performance 
metrics and requirements as well as the feedback itself. This indicates that 
companies should consider the role of satisfaction with feedback in their buyer-
supplier relationships. There is a need to not only give feedback to supplier 
companies about their performance but also to be interested in whether they 
accept that feedback. On the other side, suppliers should provide honest and 
clear feedback to the buyers about their ability to meet the performance re-
quirements as set by the buying company. Also here, there is a need to not only 
give the feedback to the buyer, but also check to what extent they accept this 
feedback. From that both companies could not only develop actions to improve 
day-to-day collaboration but also increases the closeness of the buyer-supplier 
relationship. Because, as chapter 3 shows, satisfaction with feedback contrib-
utes directly to affective commitment of buyer and supplier companies.  
This dissertation attempts to contribute to the knowledge of the role of 
close social relationships in exclusive resource exchanges between buyers and 105 
suppliers, another step in the sea of needs for deepening our understanding of 
the investments and returns in buyer-supplier relationships.   
5.4  Directions for Future Research 
Each empirical study (see chapters 2, 3 and 4) includes specific recommenda-
tions for future research. However, we would like to point out several general 
suggestions for future research on buyer-supplier collaboration. 
Throughout this dissertation, we have elaborated on the benefits of close 
social relationships in resource exchange between buyers and suppliers. Yet, 
close social relationships have also some dark sides (Anderson and Jap, 2005), 
similarly to close collaboration (Olsen and Ellram, 1997), which implies they 
might have a dual function in resource exchange in a buyer-supplier relation-
ship. It has yet not been explored what is the impact of the dark side of close 
social relationships on relational and organizational outcomes. Therefore, fu-
ture research should advance our knowledge and understanding of these nega-
tive effects of close social relationships by investigating whether there are any 
antecedents, i.e., relationship-related circumstances that enhance the emer-
gence of any of these dark side effects. 
Close social relationships prove to have a highly positive impact on gaining 
preferential benefits, customization and on enhancing information sharing 
behavior in a buyer-supplier relationship. However, the influence of a close 
social relationship between a buyer and a supplier on relational benefits might 
be diminished by the quality (or the lack of it) of specific social relationships 
between some individual employees. For example, the employee’s social rela-
tionship with a manager or a relationship strategy of a company could play a 
role. Researchers therefore should investigate the effects of close social rela-
tionships as boundary spanners inside and outside of an organization. Such 
investigations would provide insights into yet unexplored mechanisms of re-
source allocation in buyer-supplier relationships. 
Information sharing behavior consists of three components, its extent, 
evaluation of the extent and joint efforts to adjust it (Mohr and Spekman, 
1994). Yet, business environments evolved in their use of modern communica-
tion technologies. Therefore, research should also examine relational outcomes   106 
of collaboration enhanced with different forms of information and communica-
tion technology (e.g. web portals, social media, etc.) compared to interpersonal 
information sharing. This would provide companies with insights on benefits of 
alternative or complementary information sources as used in buyer-supplier 
relationships. 
Finally, in two of our three studies we investigate the effects of informa-
tion sharing on satisfaction with feedback as an indication of the acceptance of 
performance evaluation. Even though feedback is indicated as one of the im-
portant facets of supplier satisfaction (Maunu, 2003) and as an important com-
ponent of performance because it implies a reaction to appraisal feedback 
(Giles and Mossholder, 1990), satisfaction with feedback seems unexplored in 
purchasing and supply chain literature. A number of questions arise to the role 
of feedback in a buyer-supplier relationship. What, for example, are the effects 
of feedback on a company ongoing relationship policy? What impact does 
feedback have on buyer-supplier collaboration and its outcomes? What is the 
role of feedback in enhancing and damaging relationship quality (trust, com-
mitment, satisfaction)? Are interpersonal relationships useful in managing 
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1.  On page 12, the second paragraph starts with a reference to Table 1.2 and it should be a reference 
to Table 1.1. 
2.  On page 27, in Figure 2.1 in H11+ the concept Supplier Economic Benefits should be Supplier Eco-
nomic Performance. 
3.  On page 33, in H11, below the first paragraph, which reads: 
H11: Preferential buyer benefits relate positively to supplier economic benefits. 
Should be: 
H11: Preferential buyer benefits relate positively to supplier economic performance. 
4.  On page 36, in Table 2.1, point 2. Supplier Economic Benefits should be 2. Supplier Economic Per-
formance. 
5.  On page 36, in the paragraph on the test for mediation effect, in line 6, a reference to Table 2.1 
should be a reference to Table 2.2. 
6.  On page 39, in Figure 2.2 the concept Supplier Economic Benefits should be Supplier Economic 
Performance. 
7.  On page 67, in section 3.5.3 in the first paragraph in lines 9-11 with regards to (H4d) which reads: 
Supplier customization, on the other hand has no effect on a supplier’s satisfaction with feedback 
from a buyer on supplier performance (H4d).  
Should be: 
Supplier customization, on the other hand has a negative effect on a supplier’s satisfaction with 
feedback from a buyer on supplier performance (H4d). 
8.  On page 71, in the second paragraph in paragraph lines 11-16 with regards to (H4d) which reads: 
…and no effect on the supplier’s satisfaction with performance feedback from a buyer (H4d). This 
implies that the buyer feels more satisfied with the supplier’s feedback about its ability to meet 
buyer requirements when the supplier has customized to the buyer. Yet, supplier customization 
has no effect on supplier satisfaction with performance feedback coming from the buyer. 
Should be: 
…and a negative effect on the supplier’s satisfaction with performance feedback from a buyer 
(H4d). This implies that the buyer feels more satisfied with the supplier’s feedback about its ability 
to meet buyer requirements when the supplier has customized to the buyer. Yet, supplier customi-
zation has a negative effect on supplier satisfaction with performance feedback coming from the 
buyer. 
9.  On page 72, in the first paragraph in paragraph lines 6-8 which reads: 
Lack of supplier satisfaction with feedback may also be an indication that a supplier had to reallo-
cate resources from other relationships with other buyers to customize to the exclusive buyer 
(Anderson et al., 1994). 
Should be: 
Declining supplier satisfaction with feedback may also be an indication that a supplier had to real-
locate resources from other relationships with other buyers to customize to the exclusive buyer 
(Anderson et al., 1994). 